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The Washington Monthly

MAY 1973/ONE DOLLAR

Waiting for Disarmament: WEAPONS WE CAN LIVE WITH- AND WITHOUT

Henry Fairlie on How We Knew What We Were Doing When We Went into Vietnam



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

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VOLUME FIVE NUMBER THREE
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Letters

Watergate

Marjorie Boyd's "The Watergate Story" [April] is perhaps the best piece I have ever read on how power in Washington really works. I've seen it from the Hill and the White House and she has hit the truth right on the head. The problem is, no one cries ouch anymore.

BILL MOYERS
New York, New York

Foreign Aid

I've read your March article on foreign aid ["Busting Our Mental Blocks About Foreign Aid," by James Fallows]. I'm convinced that the three points you mention, reducing racial and tribal animosities, encouraging ambition and individual motivations and developing a sense of group effort are central to the development process. For many years I've tried to convince our aid people to focus on some of these areas rather than concentrating on GNP growth rates.

DONALD M. FRASER
Washington, D. C.

Donald Fraser is a U. S. Representative from Minnesota and serves on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

In his recent article on foreign aid, Mr. James Fallows avers that, despite past failures, we both *can* and *should* sustain a large-scale foreign aid program. In support of his belief that we *can* make our aid effective, Mr. Fallows offers certain grandiose propositions amounting to unprecedented intervention. In support of his belief that we *should* undertake to modernize the poor countries of the world, the writer offers no arguments at all, taking it as axiomatic, it would seem, that foreign aid is in the national interest of the United States.

In order to make our aid work, Mr. Fallows would have us undertake to reduce tribal and racial animosities within poor countries; encourage "ambition," "individual motivation," "the entrepreneurial spirit" and "pleasure in work"; and encourage the development of "that sense of community, or group effort, which distinguishes China from the Philippines, North Vietnam from the South."

It's as simple as that. All we have to do is to recast the culture, history, and life-styles of the poor countries and they will be on their way to industrial and agricultural modernization. Even if we could overcome our scruples about the "culture-busting"—Mr. Fallows says somebody is going to do that anyway—can anyone suppose such a program to be remotely within our national capacity?

To help bring about these epochal changes, Mr. Fallows recommends that we offer "alternate models" to old, unproductive life-styles through such means as a revived Peace Corps. He would also have us emphasize "forms of aid we know to be effective" such as food relief; alter the terms of trade in favor of the raw material exports of the poor countries; and "keep looking" for aid projects which will have a chain effect of development.

These are unexceptionable proposals, modest and sensible, but they fall far short of the "culture-busting" goals advocated by the author. They seem well-conceived to relieve human suffering and to have a marginal effect on development—which in fact

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are *all* we can hope to accomplish in relation to the developing countries. These suggestions, I might add, are consistent with my own proposals of October 1971—dismissed by the writer as "a few throw-away lines"—except that I would also provide technical assistance grants and "substantial United States contributions" to such international lending agencies as the World Bank and the various regional banks.

Mr. Fallows never does engage with the question of our national interest in foreign aid. Perhaps it is thought to be obvious, but the American people do not seem to find it so, nor do increasing numbers of their elected representatives. The anti-Communist argument for aid is bankrupt, and the development argument is weakened by failures. Why, our constituents now ask, is it appropriate or necessary to expend large sums on the military and economic requirements of foreign countries when our budget and balance-of-payments are in extreme deficit, when the dollar is repeatedly devalued and under attack, and the Nixon Administration is drastically reducing social programs at home on the ground that we cannot afford them. Perhaps there are good and persuasive answers to these questions, but they have yet to be put forth. And if the partisans of traditional, bilateral aid hope to persuade Congress and the people of their program's continuing validity, they are going to have to come up with something better than the discredited bromides of the past.

FRANK CHURCH
Washington, D. C.

Frank Church is a U. S. Senator from Idaho and serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The author replies:

I did not, as Senator Church suggests, recommend "unprecedented intervention." Instead, I pointed out that the world's cultures are already so mixed and opened up that "intervention" is impossible to reverse. The option of minding our own business and letting Africans and Asians pursue their development free of any outside influence is no longer open to us. So the challenge I tried to discuss was how we could find ideas that would foster a healthier form of development than that we now observe. If we draw back from this task because of fears of cultural imperialism or intervention, it is worth remembering that our culture and others will continue to intrude everywhere whether we like it or not.

As to our "national interest," I regard it as one of our political tragedies that men with the capacity for moral leadership do not exercise it, confining themselves instead to taking small-bore measurements of the popular attitudes and then aligning their own positions thereto. This is the criticism Senator Church might have made against his colleagues who were slow to join him in opposing the war: too many were afraid of getting ahead of the voters; too few took the risk of trying to explain their qualms to the public. There is now a similar role to be played in foreign aid. Men who have themselves witnessed the extremes of poverty in the world, and who therefore sense the humane obligation we in this affluent nation bear, should try to explain this obligation to the voters of this country.

Realerpolitik

I've read your review of American Government texts in the March issue of *The Washington Monthly* ["Realerpolitik: The Texts Are Getting Better," by Luke Popovich]. It is really very good—far better than most of the "academic" reviews (with the exception of a review in the *Journal of U. S. Studies* of the Soviet Academy of Sciences which praised our "realism," but still con-

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

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demns us as bourgeois capitalists).

I was particularly impressed by the clarity with which you traced the evolution of texts from traditional description through pluralist behavioralism to elite theory.

With regard to our own book, I agree with most of your criticism. But first, what I don't agree with is your notion that the Nixon-McGovern election doesn't square with our description of elections as symbolic devices to cement the masses to the established order. It seems to me that 1972 is a pretty good illustration of the validity of our chapter on parties and elections, illustrating the durability of consensus. Just as Goldwater's "radicalism" induced a massive electoral shift, so did McGovern's. To win, keep well within the confines of the center. Further (although I was, mercifully, spending a few blissful months of respite in Europe during the election), the campaign seemed to me as symbolic as any I have observed. However, we'll have to wait until more detailed survey analysis of voter perception is available.

I agree with your complaint that the book lacks a feel for the day-to-day nuts and bolts aspects of governmental life, and will take your objection very seriously in future editions.

As to the failure in prescription, welcome to the club. The nearly unanimous response to the first edition was: if these guys are going to complain so much, what alternatives do they propose? So, the second edition, which appeared in 1972, contains a new chapter entitled, "What to do about the establishment." In this chapter, Dye and I wrote separate, signed, statements. So you can now find out who likes elites and who wants to re-distribute political resources.

HARMON ZEIGLER
Eugene, Ore.

Harmon Zeigler is co-author, with Thomas R. Dye, of The Irony of Democracy *and teaches political science at the University of Oregon.*

Heller on Defense

In your February 1973 letters column, Walter Heller insisted that the Kennedy-Johnson Administration had not increased defense spending, but had created healthy economic growth through other means, such as the tax cut, etc. You too quickly agreed with Heller's main point—that defense spending did decrease during that administration.

If you will check the facts, you will find that Heller succeeded in conning you by using the old absolute-relative, shifty-base-year ploy. Heller said defense spending went down *as a percent of Gross National Product* from 1961 to 1965. In absolute numbers, it went up rapidly from $47.4 billion in 1961 to $53.6 billion in 1964, and then fell to $49.6 billion in 1965. For the four years, the government spent $17 billion *more* on defense than if it had maintained the 1961 level of spending. It is indeed true that space and other programs grew even more, but it is also obvious that the defense budget was a mainstay of the Kennedy-Johnson prosperity. In denying this by using only the 1965 data, Mr. Heller shows that he still retains the analytical flexibility required for an economist's survival in Washington.

JAMES J. TREIRES
Arlington, Va.

Professor Heller replies:

Oh come now. Do you and Mr. Treires really want your readers to believe that increases of about $2 billion in defense and $4 billion in space spending from 1961 to 1965 had more power in generating recovery and growth than $14 billion of civilian budget increases and $15 billion of tax cuts? It ought to be beneath your dignity to publish claptrap like that. Here are the detailed facts for the 1961-65 period:

■Mr. Treires is correct in pointing out that defense spending rose from $47.4 billion to $49.6 billion, or $2.2 billion (but he is dead wrong in representing me as saying that defense spending had decreased during that period).

■*The Washington Monthly* editor is also correct in asserting that space spending rose during that period—from $0.7 billion to $5.1 billion, or $4.4 billion.

■But these red herrings pale by comparison with the rise in civilian expenditures over the same period from $49.7 billion to $63.7 billion, a rise of $14 billion (of which health, education, welfare, and manpower accounted for half).

■Add to the $14 billion boost in civilian spending the $15 billion of income tax cuts in 1962 and 1964, and one can readily see that defense and space increases totaling $6.6 billion were economic pygmies in the presence of giants.

WALTER W. HELLER
Minneapolis, Minn.

Walter Heller is Regents' Professor of Economics at the University of Minnesota and former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

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We knew what we were doing when we went into Vietnam

by Henry Fairlie

"It cannot be said that the people were well informed before their commitment to the battle" in Vietnam, wrote James Reston in 1967 in *The Artillery of the Press*. Since the publication of what are called the "Pentagon Papers," his statement has been so reinforced in the public mind that it now has the life of a myth. My purpose is to demonstrate that there is no warrant for either the myth or the original statement.

There was always sufficient knowledge within the public realm on which to form a political judgment, and that is all the information which a democracy requires. Too many Americans, especially American journalists, who now perceive that their judgment failed at the time, are today anxious to exonerate themselves by pretending that the necessary information was not available. The record contradicts them.

Throughout the period when the prestige and the arms and the men of the United States were committed to the war in Vietnam, some "vigorous and properly inquiring" reporters in the field and some "vigorous and properly inquiring" commentators at home told what was happening as it happened.

The war in Vietnam has caused enough mischief; it can only cause more if the legend is allowed to persist that an innocent people and an innocent press (think of that!) were trapped into supporting the American involvement in the war by politicians who kept them in ignorance.

Henry Fairlie is an English journalist and author of The Kennedy Promise.

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Very few people—a George Ball within the government, an I. F. Stone outside it—foresaw the consequences of the early American involvement in the war. Most of us—inside the United States or beyond it—accepted the fundamental political assumptions on which the first commitment was made. It can do no good, as we seek first to identify and then to explain and finally to learn from the error, to imagine that we should look *only* to the actions of the politicians and their advisers. Of course, the attitudes and the actions of these men are of special interest and importance, since it is the politicians who issue the actual orders. However, they do not act in a vacuum, and they rarely act without a wide measure of popular support, whether spontaneous or manufactured.

"The truth is more interesting than lies," Randolph Churchill was fond of saying when he talked of his profession as a journalist; and it always is. Lies are simple; the truth is complex. The nature of the American error in Vietnam, as we begin to try to understand it, will prove to be of great complexity. There is nothing simple about it at all. What is needed, as the tragedy is at last played out, is not moral exhortation but political exegesis, not accusations of turpitude but explorations of error.

How It All Started

John Kennedy's first public reference as President to Vietnam was in his State of the Union message on January 30, 1961, when he spoke of "the relentless pressures of the Chinese communists" which "menace the entire area from the borders of India and South Vietnam to the jungles of Laos." In its issue of the same date, *The New Republic* carried an article by Denis Warner, "Diem's One-Family War," which said: "The flashes of lightning in the Laotian sky ought not to distract our attention from the thunderclouds gathering in South Vietnam, where American policies are

to be heavily tested in the lifetime of the new administration." South Vietnam, he continued, had "fallen into the status of a mendicant," but his conclusions represented the prevailing orthodoxy: "United States aid has succeeded over more than six years in keeping South Vietnam out of Communist hands. In itself, this is a major accomplishment. Trite as it may sound, the communists must be encountered where they are—at the grass roots." Quotations such as this are worth recalling because, both in their apprehensions and in their prescriptions, they accurately reflect the mood of informed public opinion at the time.

The authors of the narrative summary in the Pentagon Papers say: "Although it is hard to recall that context today, Vietnam in 1961 was a peripheral crisis. Even within Southeast Asia, it received far less of the Administration's and the world's attention than did Laos." But the record in the press at the time

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contradicts them. From the earliest days of 1961, many people within the Administration and without it were awake to the fact that the threat to South Vietnam presented a peculiarly difficult problem.

In his March 23, 1961, press conference, John Kennedy bid the American people to confront the dangers in Laos, but he made only two passing references to South Vietnam. Only one week before, on March 16, *The New York Times* had carried an article from Robert Trumbull, its correspondent in Saigon, in which he wrote: "South Vietnam is embroiled in a war with communists in which the casualties are far greater than in the more publicized hostilities in Laos." Three days later, in a further report, he said that "the communist drive in Laos is viewed here as a prelude to an intensified attack against South Vietnam," and described the struggle in South Vietnam as a "hot war."

Yet again, on March 22, the day before John Kennedy's press conference, Trumbull had reported: "South Vietnam, regarded here as the key of Southeast Asian defense against communist aggression, has become a testing ground for new United States guerrilla tactics designed for fighting in tropical jungles." This clear statement, typical of many others at the time, is a vital piece of evidence, because it was at just this moment that John Kennedy was personally insisting that his administration should give its urgent attention to the development of counterinsurgency forces; and it was equally clear to informed opinion that the country where that covert warfare would be practiced, where the counter-guerrilla forces of the United States would be engaged, was South Vietnam. No one doubted it; few questioned its desirability.

"The new moves are sufficient to represent a deep U.S. involvement in saving South Vietnam."
—The New York Times, November 15, 1961

The Press Discovers the War

On March 9, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote formally to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and CIA Director Allen Dulles: "In view of the President's instruction that we make every possible effort to launch guerrilla operations in Vietminh territory at the earliest possible time, would you report to the President as soon as feasible your views on what actions might be undertaken in the near future and what steps might be taken to expand operations in the longer future." This is the first document in the Pentagon Papers which explicitly states that the "modest program" envisaged in the original "Counter-insurgency Plan" which President Kennedy had inherited from the Eisenhower Administration was to be used as the basis for a change, not merely in the degree but in the character of the American effort to defend South Vietnam. If one reads only the Pentagon Papers, it seems to have been a secret decision. If one reads the press at the time, one is left in no doubt that the actions of the Administration were widely known and generally supported.

The press had woken up to the fact that a real war was being fought in South Vietnam. In its March 31 issue *Time* spoke of Ho Chi Minh's "blood feud against South Vietnam," which was then generally acceptable vocabulary; and on April 7, *The Washington Post* carried a report from Saigon by John Griffin of the Associated Press which said: "Months of communist terrorism have mushroomed into open warfare." The following day, an editorial in *The Washington Post* declared: "There is reason to think that South Vietnam is the real target of the southward push by the Communists . . . . The United States has a major interest in the defense of Vietnam,

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not only because of the vast amounts of economic and military aid (which only recently has been turned to the all-important guerrilla training) but also because American prestige is very much involved in the effort to protect the Vietnamese people from communist absorption."

No one was being fooled. The atmosphere in which John Kennedy was moving towards his first significant decision on the war in Vietnam, including the sending of additional American forces, was represented accurately in James Reston's mention, in *The New York Times* on April 7, of "the imperative necessity of organizing the West to confront the new communist empire." The authors of the narrative summary in the Pentagon Papers criticize the Kennedy Administration for consistently thinking in terms of a communist bloc; but this was also the thinking, with few exceptions, of the spokesmen of informed opinion.

On April 8, both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* carried a State Department official's statement to the effect that the United States "does not intend to let the people of South Vietnam down in the dangerous situation which they are now facing." The following day, an editorial in *The New York Times* declared: "Prospects for effective resistance to the Communists are better in South Vietnam than in Laos. The Ngo regime is more capable and determined than the government of Laos and commands tougher, better-led, and better-trained forces. . . . Free world forces. . . still have a chance in South Vietnam, and every effort should be made to save the situation."

The same day, *The New York Times Magazine* carried an article by Leo Cherne in which he said: "Among the hot spots in the Cold War today, one of the hottest is South Vietnam. Here a real shooting war is going forward between communist guerrillas and defenders of freedom. . . . Why is South Vietnam so important in the struggle between communism and the free world? It is physically—far more than its inaccessible neighbor Laos—the gateway to Southeast Asia's millions of square miles, which offer vast natural resources, an enormous rice surplus, and elbow room for another 200 million people. For communist strategists in Asia, it is a keystone without which empire, wealth, and breathing space cannot be achieved."

A *Washington Post* editorial proclaimed on April 11: "South Vietnam is clearly the major target of the Communist Vietminh in North Vietnam. . . . There thus remains an urgent need to strengthen Vietnam's political institutions as well as to continue the kind of military assistance and training that will make guerrilla warfare unprofitable for the Communists." This concluding sentence is an exact summary of the effort which was being made at the time by the Kennedy Administration to use the offer of increased assistance to South Vietnam in order to persuade Ngo Dinh Diem to carry out the political reforms which the American advisers in his country, military as well as civilian, believed to be necessary.

The ineffable Joseph Alsop, reporting from Ben Tre in the Kien Hoa Province of South Vietnam on April 11, was ecstatic at the discovery of another war to report: "The black-pajamaed Vietnamese ranger lieutenant saluted smartly after making his whispered report, and ran out into the night. There was a sharp rattle of gunfire, not too far away. The young colonel turned to his large table full of guests with a brilliant, mildly teasing smile. . . . 'One or two Communist companies are moving toward the town,' he said. 'I've sent one of the reinforcement groups from my reserve to oppose them. But I'm afraid dinner may be a little noisy.' " On April 14, Alsop again wrote from Ben Tre, saying that his visit to "the young colonel" had been "pretty exciting—and decidedly pleasing, too, since the good guys have been coming out on top for once." Five days later, he summarized his conclusions: "Like it

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or not, the future of Southeast Asia almost certainly depends upon beleaguered South Vietnam. This country is now under heavy communist attack."

What Diem Wanted

Meanwhile, on April 12, *The Washington Post* had carried a report from Saigon by Warren Unna which mentioned that Ngo Dinh Diem had publicly expressed the need to "include an additional 20,000 to 30,000 in forces within the year," and went on: "He was not giving away any



military secrets, because apparently the U. S. had already agreed to equip 20,000 additional men." This was a direct reference to the only important new decision which JFK had authorized in the Counterinsurgency Plan.

Similarly, on April 14, *The New York Times* editorialized: "What amounts to an expeditionary force of thousands of armed agents from Communist North Vietnam, in conjunction with local communist partisans, is engaged in a deliberate and large-scale campaign to ruin and overthrow the Southern Government through sabotage, terrorist raids, assassination and propaganda. . . . The free world must increasingly protest against and oppose communist subversive aggression as practiced today most acutely in Southeast Asia. To accept it as a matter of course is to hand the Communists half a victory without a fight." This was the mood of the country in general, as John Kennedy prepared, at the end of April, 1961, to take the steps by which he would irrevocably commit the prestige and the arms and the men of the United States to the defense of South Vietnam. On every side he was being urged to do just that, and to do it quickly.

Kennedy's first major decisions on the war in Vietnam were made in late April and early May of 1961. We will look first at the manner in which he personally prepared the public mind to accept them, and then at the manner in which the press communicated them to the American people. We will find no evidence that the people were not "well-informed."

At his April 21 conference, John Kennedy emphasized the guerrilla activity of the communists in South Vietnam at the same time he underlined the legitimacy of the government there: "Now, there's been an election in [South] Vietnam, in which 75 per cent of the people, or 80 per cent, endorse the government. And yet we read how Vietnam is in danger because of guerrilla operations. . . . How we fight that kind of problem which is going to be with us all through this decade seems to me to be one of the greatest problems now before the United States." On April 28, at a dinner in Chicago of the Democratic Party of Cook County, he repeated these figures, and added: "Now our great responsibility is to be the chief defender of freedom, in this time of maximum danger. Only the United States has the power and the determination. . . . We are prepared to meet our obligations."

On May 5, at another press conference, he received the first direct question: "Mr. President, there are reports that you would be prepared to send American forces into South Vietnam if this became necessary to prevent communist domination of that country. Could you tell us whether that is correct, and also anything else you have regarding plans for that country?" He wriggled: "The problem of troops is a matter—the matter of what we are going to do to assist

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Vietnam obtain its independence is a matter still under consideration. There are a good many which I think can most usefully wait until we have had consultations with the government—which will be one of the matters Vice President Johnson will deal with." He was stalling and was doing so visibly. But one cannot read these three successive statements, made in the course of two weeks, without acknowledging that the President was publicly pointing out the direction in which his administration was at that very moment determining to move.

"We will remain here until we win."
—Robert Kennedy, quoted in
The New York Times, February 19, 1962

Eleven years later, in its summary of the Pentagon Papers, *The New York Times* said of these early decisions: "President Kennedy made his first fresh commitment to Vietnam secretly." Specifically, it said of the dispatch of the additional military advisers and the Special Forces: "No publicity was given to either move." Let us see.

On April 23, just after the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs, *The Washington Post* carried this report by Chalmers Roberts: "At yesterday morning's session of the National Security Council, a sadder but wiser President was discussing yet another facet of the problem: what to do about the Communist Vietminh infiltration into South Vietnam. . . . What has come out of the Cuban affair has been a determination to meet the communist para-military tactics of guerrilla warfare, infiltration, sabotage, and so on. . . . Historically such undeclared warfare has been hostile to the concept of democracy. But more and more we are being forced to fight the communists on their own terms. One can surely raise the question of how far it is possible to go without destroying many aspects of democracy. . . . Mr. Kennedy feels the American people does not yet realize the kind of undeclared war we are in today, but maybe the public understands more than he thinks." In this passage, at the very beginning of the flurry of activity which was to yield the President's decisions, a distinguished political reporter had fixed on the central point in those decisions: the Administration's willingness to resort to covert warfare. Moreover, he had fixed on it in a routine report of an actual meeting of the National Security Council; he had done his homework.

But if Chalmers Roberts had doubts, *The Washington Post* itself did not. In an April 27 editorial on South Vietnam, it said: "One pertinent response to the Cuban affair is the examination of para-military capabilities. It is a fair commentary that some American intelligence activities and covert operations classified under that title have been inept and too much in the public eye. Yet few persons would question their necessity." In short, the *Post* was inciting the Administration to act more secretly, more often; it was abetting the Administration in the very secrecy for which, with the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the *Post* would later blame the Kennedy Administration.

During the flurry of activity, no one doubted that important decisions were in the making. Under the headline, "Kennedy Cuts Weekend for Crisis Talks with Rusk," E. W. Kenworthy reported in *The New York Times* May 1, that "in the two-hour meeting of the expanded National Security Council held at the White House yesterday [April 29] informed sources said, the situation in South Vietnam was considered at length along with the more immediate crisis in Laos." That was, according to the accounts in the Pentagon Papers, the meeting at which John Kennedy made the first of his decisions, based on the original report from an interagency task force headed by Roswell Gilpatric of the Defense Department and the Associated Press account of the same meeting said that "the

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problem of providing additional support for Ngo. . . was one of the problems discussed at yesterday's National Security Council meeting. . . . Administration officials said the situation in South Vietnam has been so overshadowed by the civil war in Laos that few people understood the dangers to Southeast Asia which exist there." It was altogether clear from such reports in which direction the American people were being pointed by the Administration.

On May 2, Carroll Kilpatrick reported in *The Washington Post* that "President Kennedy yesterday held his fourth National Security Council meeting in 10 days on the deteriorating situation in Laos. . . . There were reports that the United States was stepping up its military aid to South Vietnam and that urgent consideration was given to the communist threat elsewhere in Southest Asia." The reporters were being adequately informed and were doing their job.

On May 4, when the "Program of Action" on which Kennedy would base his decisions was all but completed, *The Washington Post* carried a report by Marguerite Higgins of the *New York Herald Tribune*: "The United States has given South Vietnam assurances of any necessary help to permit that embattled Southeast Asian nation to hold out against communist attack, guerrilla and otherwise, it was learned last night. These assurances could mean the dispatch of American military forces if this were asked." The following day Chalmers Roberts, also in the *Post*, was even more explicit: "The United States will give what amounts to across-the-board help to South Vietnam, now that the focus of communist attack appears to have shifted from Laos to that neighboring country." He was reporting a press conference which Dean Rusk had held on May 4, the day after the State Department had completed its own substantial revision of the task force report: "The Secretary would not confirm a report that President Kennedy had promised to send American troops to South Vietnam if that should be necessary. But Rusk did promise help 'across the spectrum'. . . . He also noted that Mr. Kennedy already has increased military assistance and authorized other unspecified measures of help."

The Troops Arrive

It was at this point, in his May 5, 1961, press conference, that Kennedy acknowledged that the dispatch of troops to South Vietnam was being considered, and the following day *The New York Times* declared in an editorial: "An important defensive role for the United States in Southeast Asia must. . . be envisaged for an indefinite time if this area is to be protected from communist aggression carried out through direct or indirect military action."

On May 7, the *Times* wrote in "The Week in Review" that "Western concern. . . has already shifted to the beleaguered South Vietnam regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem. . . . U. S. officials believe that the chance for an effective stand against the Communists in South Vietnam is far better than that in Laos." On the following day it carried an unsigned report which said: "It is believed that General Lemnitzer on his return to Washington [from a visit to Southeast Asia], will urge all-out support, including the use of United States troops, if necessary, to crush the growing Communist guerrilla activity in South Vietnam." This was in fact the advice which the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of which Lyman Lemnitzer was then the Chairman, gave on May 10 in their formal recommendation to Roswell Gilpatric. Not much was happening in the dark.

On May 11, the very day on which Kennedy made his major decisions—which included the breaking of the Geneva Agreements by dispatching 100 additional military advisers and the escalation of the American involvement in covert warfare by dispatching 400 members of the Special

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Forces—an editorial in *The New York Times* said: "Either the Communists in Vietnam should be condemned [for their infringements of the Geneva Agreements] or the right of anti-communists to engage in similar activities affirmed." This was exactly the attitude which lay at the core of the presidential program as it was authorized later in the day by John Kennedy.

An Associated Press report carried by *The New York Times* on May 12 gave an account of a speech which Vice President Lyndon Johnson had made in Saigon, and added: "Among measures which Johnson did not announce, but which were reported by informed sources, is an expansion of the United States Military Advisory Group to about 1,650 men." This figure came straight out of an April 28 task force report. The day after the AP story, Robert Trumbull reported from Saigon in *The New York Times*: "Both Vietnamese officials and Americans here expect that any troops that would be brought in would be assigned to training duties"; and this was exactly the justification in the presidential program itself.

New Republic as Prophet

As for the dispatch of the additional military advisers and the members of the Special Forces which the *Times* later said was given no publicity, *Newsweek* had already said in its May 15 issue: "President Kennedy may send American combat troops to bolster South Vietnam defenses against outright Communist attack", and then a week later it reported, accurately if incompletely, the actual decision which had been taken. In its May 22 issue, *The New Republic* editorialized: "The decision on May 14 to send in nearly 100 of the specialists in irregular warfare who have been trained at Fort Bragg may prove a most fateful one." The date was mistaken, but that hardly matters; and the sentence suggests that the writer was confusing the additional military advisers with the members of the Special Forces. But what is worth remembering is that a journal such as *The New Republic* does not have day-to-day political reporters. Given the date on which the May 22 issue must have gone to press, the magazine was, quite soon after the decisions had been made, drawing on public knowledge. The reference to "the decision of May 14" was clearly a reference to something which the author assumed the readers had already learned of elsewhere.

The importance of the *Newsweek* report and the *New Republic* editorial is that they make it clear that everyone had all the information necessary to judge the size and the meaning of what was being planned. Referring to the dispatch of the American troops, *Newsweek* added: "Undoubtedly they would come under fire." *The New Republic* commented that "if these Americans are under fire, they will presumably have the freedom to shoot back; and, once there are even a few well-publicized casualties, the prestige of the United States will have been for all practical purposes committed irrevocably to the Diem cause. The choices will then be humiliating withdrawal, as the size of the challenge grows, or progressively deeper involvement in a stalemate which may not admit of a 'victory' in anything less than a decade—some experts say even longer. . . . Vietnam's borders are wide open to sanctuaries which cannot be sealed off, not only the border with North Vietnam, but also the unpoliced Laos and Cambodian frontiers." There it all is—the story of the war as it was in fact to develop—written at the beginning, written from public knowledge, and written with a political judgment which is impressive.

In contrast, *The New York Times* failed to question what was being done. In its editorials at the time, in the columns of its commentators, even in some of its reporting, it was abreast of John Kennedy as he made his decisions, and even ahead of him now and then, and in this it repre-

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sented the press in general. From its correspondents at home and abroad, *The New York Times* was receiving and publishing the clearest evidence of what was being done. If it failed 10 years ago to understand the significance of what its own reporters were saying, it seems unjust for it to turn around now and say it was deceived by the politicians.

Bigart and Halberstam

Until late in 1963, *The New York Times* was the only daily newspaper in the United States to have a resident full-time correspondent in South Vietnam. The news agencies, of course, were represented, as were *Time* and *Newsweek*. But the astonishing fact remains that even as American casualties became a weekly, then a daily occurrence from mid-1962 to mid-1963, the American press in general did not consider the story worth the expense of sending its own reporters to Vietnam. As we pursue the story, therefore, into the period in which the action in South Vietnam became at least as important as the decisions in Washington, I will call into evidence primarily the reporting and editorials of *The New York Times*, but will reinforce these, now and then, with evidence of able reporting in *Time* and *Newsweek* and of the editorial comment and political reviews which throughout this period remained consistently alert to the meaning of what was being done.

I need only add that a necessarily rapid and selective examination of the files of *The Washington Post* and *The Los Angeles Times* has persuaded me that very little would be gained by assembling more corroborative evidence from their pages. Above all, it should be remembered that, apart from *Time* and *Newsweek*, the main source of regular information about the war in South Vietnam which reached the American people was the reporting of United Press International and the Associated Press. This reporting was of a high standard, and insofar as the newspapers in the United States published the reports of the AP and UPI correspondents in South Vietnam, their readers had the opportunity to be as accurately, if not as fully, informed as the readers of *The New York Times*, who were served in succession by Robert Trumbull, Homer Bigart, and David Halberstam. The last two of these, in particular, must be regarded among "the best and the brightest" of their profession. The consistent brilliance of the reporting of Homer Bigart preceded the erratic brilliance of that of David Halberstam; and, if one is to place a laurel on the brow which deserves it, one must say that it was Homer Bigart, who for six months in 1962 set a standard for reporting the war in Vietnam which, in the following 10 years, was not surpassed.

JFK's Tough Talk

We turn now to the fall of 1961 and John Kennedy's second series of major decisions. As he again prepared the public mind for them, Kennedy strengthened the tone of his language. In a television address on July 25, the President warned the American people of the dangers of the situation in Berlin, linking it to the "challenge in Southeast Asia, where the borders are less guarded, the enemy harder to find, and the dangers of communism less apparent to those who have so little." This was, and it was perceived at the time to be, a most significant emphasis, giving the imprecise and ill-understood commitment to the defense of South Vietnam the same character as the precise and well-understood commitment to the defense of West Berlin.

On August 2, after meetings with Chen Cheng, vice president of the Nationalist Republic of China, Kennedy declared that "the United States is determined that the Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost to the communists for lack of support which the United States can render." Addressing the United Nations on Sep-

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tember 25, the President said that "South Vietnam is already under attack," and that if the communists were successful there, "the gates will be opened wide." In the light of these words, again and again defining and hardening the commitment which he was making on behalf of the United States, it was impossible to misread the announcements of actual decisions, even if these announcements were incomplete, obscure, and sometimes even devious.

On June 28, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum to Robert McNamara —National Security Action Memorandum No. 56—in which he said the President had decided that "it is important that we anticipate now our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations." It was this general authorization of American involvement in covert warfare which was important.

The Administration's "general interest in doing something about counterinsurgency warfare," says the narrative summary in the Pentagon Papers, had provided an impetus to the decisions taken in late April and early May. That impetus was to be maintained, and the Administration's inclination was known and published, debated, and supported. On July 17, *The New York Times* published a Reuters report under the headline "Test For U. S. Tactics Seen," which said: "The war between Government troops and communist-led guerrillas in South Vietnam is considered a test of the new United States Army tactics for jungle fighting." This report was not buried inside the newspaper; it was on its front page. Two weeks later, the *Times* published a report from E. W. Kenworthy under the extended headline, "U. S. Study of Guerrilla Warfare Stimulated by Asian Experience. . . . Fighting in Vietnam and Laos Shows Need for Countering the Strategy Set by Mao for 'Liberation' Conflicts." In the course of his report, Kenworthy said that "there is one card the Communists do not hold—time," and he casually mentioned that according to *The New York Times*, "no publicity" had been given to the fact that the United States recently sent to South Vietnam 100 men from its Special Forces Organization in Okinawa.

Two weeks later, in an editorial entitled "Combating Red Guerrillas," the *Times* proclaimed: "Without such international action, to quote Mr. [Walter] Rostow again, 'those against whom aggression is directed will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront.' A time of decision on this alternative may come for both the United States and South Vietnam as part of the new anti-guerrilla campaign described by Mr. [Roger] Hilsman." One must point out that this editorial was based on public utterances of two senior members of the government; the Administration was in fact advertising its actions.

"If the U.S. cannot or will not save South Vietnam from Communist assault, no Asian nation can ever again feel safe in putting its faith in the U.S."
—Time, August 4, 1961

Meanwhile, in his July 31 newsletter, I. F. Stone noted the preparations which were being made and Douglas MacArthur's recent warning to Kennedy against involving the United States in a ground war on the Asian mainland, and added: "There lies the biggest trap of all for our conventional warriors, a quicksand which could absorb a major share of our youth in endless 'limited' war." On August 4, *Time* noticed the same preparations and supported them: "The United States has made a major decision: South Vietnam must be defended at all costs. . . . If the United States cannot or will not save South Vietnam from the communist assault, no Asian nation can ever again feel safe in putting its faith in the United States. . . . In committing itself to the

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defense of South Vietnam, the United States has also committed itself to the support of President Diem. . . . His achievements are impressive." This was, it should be added, a cover story. In both the warning of I. F. Stone and the advocacy of *Time* there was the same awareness of the size and meaning of the commitment which Kennedy had made.

On the evening of September 29, 1961, Ngo Dinh Diem, in a meeting with Frederick Nolting, United States Ambassador in Saigon, and Admiral Harry Felt, the commander-in-chief of United States forces in the Pacific, made the "rather large and unexpected request" for "a bilateral defense treaty with the United States." Whether or not this request provided the impetus which the compilers of the Pentagon Papers attribute to it—there seems to be at least equal evidence that the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam, which was being fully reported by Robert Trumbull in the *Times*, provided impetus enough—the next six weeks were to be occupied by an exhaustive review of American policy, including the much-publicized mission of General Maxwell Taylor to Saigon, and culminating in the decisions which Kennedy made sometime in the two weeks before November 22, 1961, when National Security Action Memorandum No. 111, which formally continued them, was signed and distributed.

Once again, one must avoid the trap of looking too closely at the details of this decision, and then demonstrating that all these details were not known or published. More important than the actual decisions were: a conscious and explicit hardening of the American commitment; a clear implication, in a reference to SEATO, that the United States was embarking on a course in which it would be likely to have to act alone rather than as the leader of an alliance; a straightforward acknowledgment that American combat troops might at some time have to be overtly introduced; a decision to intensify the American covert involvement in combat operations: and a plain statement that one of the purposes of the new arrangements was to expand the American direction and control of military operations. In short, what was being proposed was the "Americanization" of the war, or to put it ironically, its "de-Vietnamization."

Fateful Decisions

How much of this was known at the time?

On October 3, 1961, *The New York Times* carried a UPI report of a statement by State Department spokesman Joseph Reap saying that the United States was "taking urgent measures to help South Vietnam combat an increase in communist guerrilla activity." He went on to say that the United States agreed with a statement which Ngo Dinh Diem had made the day before to the effect that "it is no longer a guerrilla war we have to face, but a real war." The echo promptly came from *The New York Times* in an editorial on October 6: "The communist insurrection in Vietnam, directed and regularly reinforced from the North, assumes ever-increasing proportions, and may soon reach the stage of large-scale warfare. . . . If it is to be successfully met, military contingents from the SEATO countries, including the United States, may well be required."

Two days later, the *Times* carried a report from Jack Raymond, its correspondent at the Department of Defense, saying: "A basic decision to send troops, including combat units as well as training personnel, has been made. . . . The United States' new military approach, including its own increased commitment, would involve dispatching to key points highly mobile regimental combat teams, equipped with helicopters and other support aircraft. . . . The combat teams would be deployed to strengthen these instructors [the military advisers], but they would be prepared to

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engage in direct combat operations as well." This report appeared on the front page of the newspaper, under the headline, "U. S. Considering Sending Troops to Help Vietnam," and it accurately reflected some of the most significant proposals which were at that moment being reviewed, and which Kennedy later authorized.

On October 12, reporting the decision to send General Maxwell Taylor to South Vietnam, Jack Raymond wrote: "The Administration is understood to be seriously considering two types of additional military assistance . . . . One of the plans calls for sending combat units to strategic points in Southeast Asia. . . . The other plan calls for a sizable special mission, such as the one that was sent to Greece in 1948." He then added: "It would not be limited to rear-area training." This account also appeared on the front page. Inside, an editorial declared: "General Taylor's expert appraisal should be of great usefulness in reaching the fateful decisions that are looming if communist aggression in Southeast Asia is to be stopped." The following day it published a "news analysis" by Wallace Carroll, the substance of which was summarized in the headline: "Kennedy Turns to Power. . . . His Hopes of Arousing World Opinion Give Way to Need for Physical Might." What was being concealed?

The First Casualty

The mission of General Taylor was reported by Robert Trumbull. Each day he addressed himself to the possibility that its outcome would be a decision, "positive or negative," as to whether American combat troops, "in either a combat or a support capacity," would be sent to South Vietnam. The size of what was being contemplated was widely understood and its meaning seemed to be emphasized when he reported on October 30, that an American officer, on a "training patrol," had been shot in the leg, "the first reported casualty in



actual military operations in South Vietnam."

The New York Times continued in its militant mood. In an editorial on October 27 it said that, if the International Control Commission "now declines to identify what is occurring in South Vietnam as the aggression that it is, [it] should also absolve both Saigon and Washington from any further obligations to observe the Geneva Accords—including the limitations they impose on domestic and foreign military forces and armaments in the South." It concluded fiercely: "The present situation is one that brooks no further stalling."

On November 4 E. W. Kenworthy reported from Washington: "Officials said it was correct to infer. . . that General Taylor did not look favorably on the sending of United States combat troops at this time. However, it was said that he probably would recommend the dispatch of more Army specialists in anti-guerrilla warfare to. . . train Vietnamese troops, communications and transport specialists and army engineers to help the Vietnam government to combat its flood problems." This was an accurate report as the two weeks of decision began. On November 7, an editorial in *The New York Times* said that "following the return of his special emissary, General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy is reported to be leaning against the dispatch of regular United States combat units to South Vietnam. We believe he is correct in this attitude." (A curious position in

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light of the *Times'* previous editorials.) It concluded that "the battle is not yet lost in South Vietnam; and, indeed, it can still be won by the proper use of all resources, American and Vietnamese." This can only be interpreted as a blanket approval for the decisions which were in fact taken.

Going in with Both Eyes Open

In an unsigned report from Saigon, which appeared on the front page on November 9, the *Times* said: "The United States Air Force has begun a huge supply and training program here to strengthen South Vietnam's defenses against intensified communist guerrilla operations. The nature of the program was defined—within the limits of security—by an official source today. The operation, he said, involves a movement of masses of United States equipment, planes, and personnel. It does not include, the source added, the use of United States ground combat units. . . . Whether the role of United States airmen already here or on the way might be broadened to include tactical missions was not disclosed. . . .An informed source said that several hundred United States pilots and other personnel would come to South Vietnam on a 'training mission' in the stepped-up aid program. . . . This on-the-spot training of South Vietnamese pilots is a sharp departure from previous practices. In the past, all South Vietnamese military pilots were sent to the United States and the training took 18 months." How could the meaning of what had been decided be made clearer? This report appeared even before the decision had been formalized.

"The possibilities of escalation in Vietnam are not to be minimized."
—The New York Times, November 15, 1961

The meeting of the National Security Council which formally considered the recommendations was held on November 15, and its proceedings were accurately and adequately reported two days later by E. W. Kenworthy. On the same day, a *New York Times* editorial said that "the new moves are sufficient to represent a deep United States involvement in saving South Vietnam. If it turns out they are not enough, do they imply an obligation to do still more, to become completely committed? This is a question Washington will face when the effects of the present program become evident a few months from now. The Administration is right in deciding against American combat forces at the present time, but if the situation becomes increasingly critical, a new and even more difficult appraisal will have to be made." It concluded: "The possibilities of escalation in Vietnam are not to be minimized."

There it is. Neither in its reports nor in its editorials is there the slightest evidence that, when John Kennedy made his truly major commitment of the prestige and the arms and the men of the United States to the defense of South Vietnam in the fall of 1961, *The New York Times* did not know what was being determined, did not understand it, and did not support it. Through its pages, informed public opinion could also know, could also understand, and could support it or not.

Devious, Yes. Believable, No.

With the decisions of 1961 the President had made his major commitment. During the next two years, the actions of his Administration merely built on it: gradually introducing more and more arms, more aircraft, and more men into South Vietnam, moving the men deeper and deeper into embattled areas and combat operations, struggling more and more fiercely to wrest the control of the military operations from the government of Ngo Dinh Diem and his commanders, until at last it connived in Diem's overthrow by a military

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coup.

It is only necessary, at this stage of the story, to demonstrate that the nature of the war in which the United States had become involved, the nature of the involvement itself, the nature of the difficulties which it was encountering, and the nature of the consequences which could be foreseen were not secret. The information was available to the American people, or at least those who cared to take an interest, to the leaders of informed opinion, and above all, to the readers of *The New York Times*, on whose pages I will again primarily draw for the evidence. John Kennedy sought to obscure, even to deceive; but he did not succeed.

In his State of the Union message on January 11, 1962, Kennedy described the communist subversion in South Vietnam, "where the foe is increasing his tactics of terror—where our own efforts have been stepped up," as "a war of attempted subjugation—and it will be resisted." In his January 15 press conference, he was asked: "Mr. President, are American troops in combat in Vietnam?" Kennedy gave the one-syllable reply: "No." Devious he may have been; that does not mean that he was believed.

There was good reason not to believe the President, since the nature of the American involvement was being clearly reported. On December 20, 1961, Jack Raymond had already reported in *The New York Times* that "United States military men were understood today to be operating in battle areas with South Vietnamese forces that are fighting communist guerrillas." Could anyone doubt the meaning of that? Indeed, two days later, the *Times* looked again at the details which were "slowly emerging from reticent Administration sources about the expanded American participation in South Vietnam," and proclaimed in an editorial: "These new arrangements. . . represent a very extensive American commitment." It was soon to learn, from its own correspondent in Saigon, how extensive.

On January 1, 1962, on his way out of South Vietnam, Robert Trumbull reported from Hong Kong that "numerous techniques hitherto unseen in South Vietnam are being inaugurated or are about to be used," and he mentioned defoliation and the movement of South Vietnamese troops into combat by American helicopters flown by American pilots. On January 8, *The New York Times* published the first report from Homer Bigart: "Communist terrorists have killed two Americans and captured a third in the Saigon area in the last three weeks." In a sense, it was an appropriate beginning. From that moment, Homer Bigart was to report what he saw, as he saw it.

On January 11, the day after Max Frankel had reported from Washington that the Administration "foresees a long and bitter struggle lasting many years, without dramatic victory or resolution," Homer Bigart wrote that "the crucially important area of the upper Mekong delta, which controls the southern approaches to Saigon, has been heavily infiltrated by communist guerrillas. The Communists control about 80 per cent of the area's villages." The real reporting of the war had started. In its issue of six days earlier, *Time* had said, in an account of an engagement near Duc Hoa, that "not only South Vietnamese soldiers were being employed" and gave the name of an American soldier who had been killed in the action.

A Decade of War

Throughout February, 1962, Kennedy refused to publicly admit that American troops were in combat, but his answers and statements became increasingly hard to believe, not least because, during this single month, *The New York Times* carried the following reports and comments:

■February 5: An Associated Press report from Hung My that one American helicopter had been shot down and a second had been hit while

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taking part in an operation;

■February 12: A report from Jack Raymond that officials in Washington "feel that there is a mounting danger that more United States servicemen will be killed in what are now openly described as United States military operations. . . . Tied to that problem is the fear that Americans are not ready to accept the idea of a long, drawn-out struggle. . . . The United States is said to be determined to put in what it takes to win";

■February 14: An editorial which said that "there should. . . . be no concealment of the possibility that what we are doing in South Vietnam may escalate into a major conflict"; and the clear statement by James Reston that "the United States is now involved in an undeclared war in South Vietnam";

"Americans have given their solemn word that they will stay to win here. If they fail, the word will be out that Americans are paper tigers."
—David Halberstam, The New York Times, March 11, 1963

■February 16: A report from Homer Bigart that "the United States officials lifted a ban on propaganda flights by American air crews imposed after the death of eight Americans Sunday in the crash of a leaflet plane. . . . Americans may now resume scattering President Ngo Dinh Diem's Chinese New Year message. . . . When that is done, they will drop a New Year message on President Kennedy"; this scorn was to become a mark of his reporting;

■February 19: An unsigned report from Saigon that at a press conference given by Robert Kennedy there, a British correspondent had asked, "American boys are dying out here. Do the American people understand and approve of what is going on?" to which Kennedy replied: "I think the American people understand and fully support the struggle." He also said: "We will remain here until we win," a remark which was to haunt him;

■February 23: An editorial which said: "As the Kennedy Administration is now taking care to let Americans know"—a significant admission—"the United States is involved in a struggle that will be long and brutal. It is a struggle this country cannot shirk," words which could hardly be clearer or stronger;

■February 27: A report from Tad Szulc in Washington that "the view here is that the guerrilla war in the swamps, rice paddies, and mountains of Vietnam may be as long as 10 years," and one must notice this repeated emphasis, communicated by the Administration, that the war might last a decade.

Honest Reporting

In March and April of 1962, Kennedy made only three significant references to the war in Vietnam. The first was important only because he refused to make a statement. The second was significant only because the President still refused to admit that American troops were in combat. And the third, which came at an April 11 press conference, was noteworthy because he at last mentioned the fact that American soldiers had been killed. Even this acknowledgment was made only in an aside when he was trying to rally the country against the steel companies.

But while Kennedy was being so "elusive," to use the description of Theodore Sorensen, the public was still being told what was actually happening. A March 1 editorial in *The New York Times* said that the "intensified struggle" in South Vietnam was "a situation from which the United States cannot now withdraw. . . . It is a situation which the American people must understand and face up to."

On March 16, the *Times* published an unsigned report from Washington that Robert McNamara had publicly

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stated that "United States military training personnel in South Vietnam have exchanged fire with communist guerrillas"; and, in its issue of the same date, *Time* reported that, "since the United States role, technically, is to instruct government pilots, Vietnamese trainees accompany the American pilots on bombing and strafing missions against the Communist Vietcong. When fast action is needed, it is the United States air power that does the job."

The reporting of Homer Bigart was now reaching its full power. Again and again, in his routine reports, whether he was telling of an individual action or an extensive operation, he emphasized the covert character of the American involvement. On March 25 he reported that the United States was "quietly supporting an irregular army called the Sea Swallows, led by an expatriate Chinese Roman Catholic priest," and went on: "Legally, United States military aid cannot be given to an irregular force. It would require the authorization of Congress." A week later, he said that "the United States has assumed moral responsibility for a harsh and drastic military measure. . . the resettlement, by force if necessary, of thousands of Vietnamese families," and added: "No one should expect this operation to pass without charges of American complicity in allegedly evil acts." On April 16, he reported that "another indication of the deepening American involvement in South Vietnam's campaign against the communist guerrillas was the arrival in Saigon today of a Pentagon study group that included Allen W. Dulles"; and three days later he pressed home his reading of the military situation in a report under the headline: "Reds Still Win in South Vietnam. . . . Guerrillas Gain Despite Aid to Loyal Forces by U. S."

The importance of Bigart's reporting was that he was alerting informed public opinion to the reality of the situation. "Between the lines of Homer Bigart's *New York Times* dispatches from Saigon," an editorial in *The Nation* of April 14 said, "one can read an increasingly urgent note of warning"; and Bigart was not alone. In the April 23 *Newsweek* its tenacious correspondent, Francois Sully, said that the deaths of two more American soldiers "underlined for every American the reality of United States involvement in the Vietnam war. . . . The United States, in short, has passed the point of no return—short of victory—in South Vietnam."

From Berlin to Bien Hoa

During the summer of 1962 John Kennedy spoke openly of the presence of American forces, still refusing to admit that they were in combat, even though they were being killed; he gave more than one hint that he was aware of the size and the length of the involvement which was being undertaken; and he said that it could not be refused by the American people. As he sought to justify the commitment of American troops, Kennedy increasingly linked the war in Vietnam to the idea that the United States was engaged in a global war against communism. On May 4, in a speech at New Orleans, he talked of the range of the U. S. military commitment, from "the American soldier guarding the Brandenburg Gate to the Americans now in Vietnam." At his press conference on June 14, he said that "a withdrawal in the case of Vietnam, and in the case of Thailand, might mean a collapse of the whole area." Six days later, he declared to an audience of college students: "It is the United States which is making the major effort in Vietnam." Even in his own words, the direction was clear enough to make a political judgment; but this was especially true because the reports in the press, by which his words could be interpreted, continued to gather their force, in spite of the attempts at censorship.

By the end of June, 1962, Homer Bigart had withdrawn from Vietnam embittered and angry. His reports before he left remained as penetrating

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and fierce as ever. An editorial in *The Nation* of July 14, commenting on the "curtain of lies" behind which events in Vietnam were taking place, said that the fictions were "dissipated almost daily by Homer Bigart," and asked that the American press "bring these fragments [of truth] to the attention of the American people."

This was a pertinent remark, for if there was any sense in which it can be said that the American people at this time were "not well-informed," it was not that they lacked the facts. Rather, it was that even those newspapers and news magazines which were publishing the facts from their correspondents in the field did not try to make coherent sense of them; and the reason for this failure was that they, like almost everyone else, were fundamentally agreed that the line against the "communist bloc" had to be held in Southeast Asia.

Finding a Scapegoat

The criticism that was being made was not of the rationale for the war, but of the way the war was being fought, and the criticism of the war effort during 1962 became increasingly a criticism of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem for its corruption and unpopularity and inefficiency. This was the tenor even of Homer Bigart's final reflections, which appeared in *The New York Times* July 25: "Victory is remote. The issue remains in doubt because the Vietnamese President seems incapable of winning the loyalty of his people. . . visions of ultimate victory are obscured by the image of a secretive, suspicious, dictatorial regime. . . . Should the situation deteriorate further, Washington may face the alternatives of ditching Ngo Dinh Diem for a military junta or sending combat troops to bolster the regime." This passage, resurrected by David Halberstam in *The Making of a Quagmire*, is of extreme significance.

During the next 15 months, the decision as to whether to send American combat troops to Vietnam—"combat troops," that is, as John Kennedy defined them—was to be deferred by the fiction that it was only the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem that was impeding the already massive American effort. He had only to be removed, and all would be well.

By the end of 1962, this fiction had become the prevailing orthodoxy within the Administration, within the American press in general, and even within the tightly-knit group of American correspondents in Saigon. They all joined in their diagnosis of the situation and in their prescription of the remedy until Diem was at last overthrown and assassinated.

"United States-Vietnam relations have entered a new, delicate, and extremely tense state, in the view of qualified observers here," David Halberstam reported as early as February 15, 1963. "The Americans, traditionally impatient, are instinctively attempting to gain a greater behind-the-scenes role. Vietnamese in turn are wary of Americans playing too great a role and of giving them too much power."

This was now to become one of the persistent themes in his reporting and in that of other correspondents. Halberstam and the others formed close relationships with some of the American military officers in the field; the American military officers were, as Halberstam said, impatient at Vietnamese methods of fighting—and of not fighting; the correspondents communicated their impatience. "Commanders of South Vietnam's military forces in the Mekong River delta have developed a tendency to avoid contact with large forces of Vietcong guerrillas," Halberstam reported on March 1. "In addition, United States military officials feel that escape routes for the Communists have been left open so that military operations could be avoided. . . . The tendency is depressing to the Americans." Intentionally or not, the direction in which such reporting pointed was to the "de-Vietnamization" and "Americanization" of the war.

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"The stakes are sizable," he wrote on March 11. "Americans have given their solemn word that they will stay to win here: if they fail, the word will be out throughout this region that Americans are paper tigers, and no little country will want to be on the wrong side of China."

Perhaps even more emphatically, this was the attitude of *The New York Times* itself on the following day, when it declared in an editorial: "It has to be recognized that the United States is not likely to be able to diminish its role in Southeast Asia in the near future. . . . The cost is large, but the cost of Southeast Asia coming under the domination of Russia and Communist China would be still larger." Indeed, on April 8, in an editorial replying to a protest by Bertrand Russell against the American conduct of the war, it excused the use of napalm and defoliation: "Napalm has been used by the South Vietnamese air force against real or imagined havens of Vietcong guerrillas. Its use has certainly killed innocent people—as other weapons have done. . . . Defoliation chemicals (common weed killers) have been employed largely in attempts to strip leaves from heavy jungle growth near lines of communication."

"The United States, in short, has passed the point of no return—short of victory—in South Vietnam."
—Newsweek, April 23, 1962

During the spring and early summer, Halberstam continued to report the doubts of American military officers about individual operations and about the capability of the South Vietnamese forces, but he remained firm in his conviction that the war must be fought and won. "If there is considerable division within the United States mission over the success of current programs," he wrote on May 5, "there is little division over the immense extent to which the United States has committed its international prestige. It is a difficult and demanding situation. There is nothing simple about Vietnam. With all of Southeast Asia watching, the United States stands to win big—or to lose on an equal scale." On June 16, Halberstam wrote, "if Asian communists. . . eventually gain their demands in Vietnam—not necessarily a military victory here, but a trip to Geneva and a 'neutral' South Vietnam—then the implications are immense, not only for this country's 15 million people. Equally important would be the psychological victory over the communists' real enemy, the Americans, in an area where the Americans have staked out a line."

This clear declaration of the American national interest in winning the war occurred in a report in which he discussed Diem's reactions to the Buddhist protests; and he reported that there was a feeling among observers in Saigon "that the Government's reaction in this protest is not an isolated episode, but proof of a pattern in which its strong qualities—anti-communism, stubbornness, resilience—are no longer enough."

A mood was being created in which the actions against Diem could be taken; the press and the Administration were joined in preparing it. "This week," Halberstam reported on July 7, "American officials were talking about South Vietnam's government with the same cool tone that reporters formerly used." In a further report three weeks later, he kept up the pressure: "Americans are running into basic political problems at the Presidential Palace. And they have had little success in putting across tactical advice."

Putting the Squeeze on Diem

One day after forces of the government of South Vietnam had raided a Buddhist pagoda and arrested 100 Buddhist monks, *The New York Times* carried the front page headline: "Two Versions of the Crisis in Vietnam." The first version, from Tad

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Szulc in Washington, reported the view of the Administration that the South Vietnamese army was responsible for the raid; the second version, from David Halberstam in Saigon, placed the responsibility on Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of Ngo Dinh Diem. On August 25, 1963, Hedrick Smith reported from Washington: "Officials here are moving to the conclusion that Ngo Dinh Nhu. . . brought about this week's crackdown on Buddhists." Then, on August 27, Tad Szulc reported from Washington that the Administration had "formally and pointedly" absolved the South Vietnamese army leaders: "A statement underlined the Administration's emerging policy: to encourage army commanders to intervene in Vietnamese politics."

> "Some officials now believe that the only plausible solution may be to remove Mr. Nhu or both brothers through a coup d'etat."
> —The New York Times, August 27, 1963

Tad Szulc continued: "The prevailing view here remained that President Diem's rule might still be saved if he and the army joined to oust Mr. Nhu. If this is impossible, it is suggested the next step may be a decision by the United States to end its association with the regime and place in the army all hope for stability in the country." On the same day David Halberstam reported from Saigon that "key Vietnamese have long waited for Washington to give an indication that it had had enough of the Nhu family." On the following day, Tad Szulc again reported from Washington: "Some officials now believe that the only plausible solution may be to remove Mr. Nhu or both brothers through a coup d'etat by Vietnamese army commanders."

On the same day, *The New York Times* pronounced in an editorial: "The United States' problem is how to encourage Vietnamese forces interested in constitutional change, without using the sanction of withdrawing aid for the struggle against the Vietcong—a sanction that would risk the loss of that struggle." On August 31, 1963, Halberstam again reported: "The United States appears to be moving deliberately toward a confrontation with the Ngo family government. . . . the United States is ready to initiate action that might lead to the overthrow of the government. Most observers here believe that Americans will give a signal to key elements of the military." He concluded: "Americans are known to have been contacting key people in the military recently."

When the *Times* presented the Pentagon Papers for these months its story appeared under the by-line of Hedrick Smith, who had been one of its reporters in Washington at the time. Smith said: "The Pentagon's secret study of the Vietnam war discloses that President Kennedy knew and approved of plans for the military coup d'etat that overthrew President Ngo Dinh Diem." But *The New York Times* had been disclosing this fact at the time, and it was clear from the reports of both Halberstam in Saigon (who referred to "highly informed diplomatic sources") and Tad Szulc in Washington, to say nothing of those of Hedrick Smith, that they were receiving their information from the Administration, its officials, and its advisers, which was accused, seven and a half years later, of having acted in secret.

The Making of an American War

If there was a conspiracy afoot, the conspiracy was hardly secret. On September 1, the day before Kennedy first spoke, Tad Szulc wrote of "this delicate undertaking—in which the pragmatic American version of Florentine intrigue is pitted against the oriental mandarins of the Saigon regime." The day after Kennedy publicly stated that he was looking for a

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change in "the personnel" of the government of Ngo Dinh Diem, James Reston wrote: "It was like the head of a foreign government publicly announcing that the President was pursuing a losing policy, was out of touch with the American people, but might make amends by firing Bobby." He concluded: "The situation from there [in Saigon] is a mess, recommending silence."

That the overthrow of Diem would mean, as it also reflected, the "Americanization" of the war was made clear in an editorial in *The New York Times* on September 6: "The lessons of the present crisis are plain. One is that the anti-communist war in South Vietnam, which has produced the best fighting force in Indochina, is not only, as President Kennedy declared, 'their war' but our war—a war from which we cannot retreat and which we dare not lose." Yet, when this same newspaper published its version of the Pentagon Papers, Hedrick Smith quoted from the narrative summary: "Our complicity in this overthrow heightened our responsibilities and our commitment." And he quoted these words without any acknowledgment that, at the time, *The New York Times* had been advocating just such an expansion of the American commitment, so that "their war" would become "our war."

In an editorial on September 22 the *Times* again pointed out that "as President Kennedy has stated, the stakes in Southeast Asia are too high for us to see the war lost. . . . Any policy is better than no policy at all or a dozen policies operating at cross-purposes." This was a confession that the Administration's policy, and the paper's own editorial stance, were bankrupt; and the words, banal as they were, should be remembered. The escape from this bankruptcy was to be found in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, and it was not only *The New York Times* that was pointing in that direction. "Time is running perilously short," commented *Newsweek* in its September 2 issue. "The United States must now make this basic and crucial reassessment: Is the anti-communist struggle, with the Ngo clique in charge, hopeless? If it is, Washington will have to use its influence to bring about a change in regime." In its October 11 issue reporting a visit which Robert McNamara had just made to South Vietnam, *Life* said: "Our policy henceforth will be to interfere in Vietnamese politics."

The final commitment was being made: the war was being "de-Vietnamized" and so "Americanized": a process which would be painfully put into reverse six years later, after a terrible price had been paid, as the "Vietnamization or "re-Vietnamization" of the war was begun. This final commitment was made when there was full public knowledge of it in the press, and when the press in general supported it. On October 21, 1962, shortly after his arrival in South Vietnam, David Halberstam had written, "Despite all the American aid, this is not yet an American war." It had now become one.

One may end the story there. Three weeks after the assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem, in which he had collaborated, John Kennedy was himself assassinated.

The object of this study has been to tell, not the story of the events, but the story of the public knowledge of them. The story of the events—of the manner in which the United States became embroiled in a war whose magnitude was far beyond that which anyone intended or contemplated—will require from the historian the most patient research, the most disinterested interpretation of the facts, the most severe self-discipline in refusing the advantages of hindsight. Perhaps, above all, he will have to take into account the state of public opinion, including informed opinion, at the time: for at no moment, as the commitment was made, were the American press or the American people in the dark about what was being done. ■

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TIDBITS and OUTRAGES

InTTernationalism

The Washington Post's Laurence Stern began his April 2, 1973, ITT story:

> The most lurid of Marxist propaganda parables against the excesses of U. S. imperialism couldn't have been plotted with more heavy-handed caricature than the ITT saga in Chile.

Stern went on to recall another episode in ITT's long crusade to prove Marx right. During World War II, ITT owned the company that produced the Luftwaffe's Focke-Wulff fighter. After the war, ITT collected several million dollars in damages from the U. S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission for allied bombing damage to the Focke-Wulff plants.

Moving Violations

As part of our continuing effort to assist the Administration in its campaign against lawlessness, we note that the 1946 Administrative Expenses Act says "official purposes. . . shall not include the transportation of officers and employees between their domiciles and places of employment." According to *The Wall Street Journal*'s Ronald G. Shafer, "The Defense Department alone chauffeurs up to 52 civilians and military officials to and from work every day."

Making Piles From Loopholes

In 1969 Congress enacted a minimum income tax designed to meet the public outrage over millionaires who were paying no taxes. Senator Walter Mondale recently received a preliminary Treasury Department study which shows that in 1971 there were 276 individuals with incomes over $100,000 who paid no federal income taxes. Furthermore, Mondale pointed out, the Treasury's $100,000 figure was adjusted gross income, and does not include half the capital gains income, depreciation deductions, depletion allowances, or interest from state and local bonds, meaning, in the Senator's words, "the 276 are the barest tip of the iceberg."

The Deprived

The FAA, in an effort to transfer air traffic from Washington's over-used National Airport to under-used Dulles, has proposed restricting National to short-range flights. Since the proposal was made on January 29, 1973, about 200 written comments have been filed with the FAA. One was from Joseph Danzansky, president of Giant Food:

> My family and I make the trip to Miami 12 or more times a year. . . . It would be unfair to deprive us of the time-saving nonstop flights.

Idealism in the Social Sciences

An advertisement in *Psychology Today* addressed to sociologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, educators, and anthropologists begins by asking why 12,000 professionals subscribe to *Behavior Today* and ends with "Send payment now and receive a free bonus, 'Money & How to Get It,' a guide to fund resources."

Ivory Featherbed

Our suspicion that featherbedding in America is by conscious choice has been heightened by a recent survey of the American Council of Education showing that although more than two thirds of the college seniors have found their university experience largely irrelevant, about half (48.7 per cent) are planning to go on for advanced degrees.

Ignorance Is Bliss

A couple of months ago we commented in this space about our difficulty in persuading journalists to write about the dangers of nuclear hijacking and blackmail. We are indebted to *Foreign Policy* and George H. Quester's *Nuclear Diplomacy* for a chart that dramatizes the problem:



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Waiting for disarmament:

by C. Robert Zelnick

If we bought defense the same way we buy sewers, spending more when we need to and less when we don't, now might seem a good time to cut the Pentagon's budget. The year just past saw the end of U. S. fighting in Vietnam and the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), so reducing two of the Pentagon's recent heavy-expense items. But now the generals are on Capitol Hill asking for more money than ever—$79 billion for fiscal year 1974. This is a $4.2-billion increase over last year's budget, and equals the total amount collected in personal income taxes in 1972.

The alarming thing about the budget is that it will almost certainly be approved. After the bits of prefabricated lard have been removed, the defense budget will emerge from Congress with its basic reasoning and priorities as unchanged as they have been for years. Planning our national defense system is too important a matter to leave to the Department of Defense (DOD), but Congress has given little indication that it's capable of providing the missing leadership.

There are many reasons for congressional diffidence in handling the Pentagon's requests. One is probably the liberals' reluctance to wrestle with the brass on purely tactical questions: if you tell your constituents that you believe in disarmament, how can you be seen bickering with the Air Force over whether the B-1 is a more efficient means of inflicting mass destruction than the B-52? There is also a temptation for liberal critics to speak only in symbolic terms—"we could feed a thousand children (clean a hundred streams, cut taxes) for the price of this tank." This sense of perspective is fine, except that it often precludes the more substantive questioning that could beat the military on its own terms; all too rarely do questions like "Doesn't this weapon do the same thing as the one you already have?" or "Do we really need this new missile?" appear in the hearings.

Not all of this is the congressmen's fault. The Pentagon's opponents face much the same difficulty as the critics

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Weapons we can live with—and without

of religion or the flat-world theory did in earlier centuries: since conclusive evidence and information is so scanty, it's hard to prove your point. After a month's study, a congressman may feel he has a clear understanding of the pros and cons involved when a pipeline is built or a poverty program is cut off. But the lurking fear among defense critics is that the generals *may* know what they're talking about better than the congressmen, that as the bombs start to fall there will be little placards tacked inside the public fallout shelters saying, "Congressman X voted against the ABM."

The Pentagon does what it can to add to this mystique, dressing its proposals up in unintelligible acronyms (ARBES, SCAD, etc.) and hoarding the data necessary to evaluate the terms.

Outside investigators soon discover how limited their resources are. They must rely on a handful of former military officers who have "seen the light;" a few once-and-future Defense officials who now practice law in Washington or are associated with one of the foundation "think tanks," and perhaps five or six knowledgeable congressmen and their staff aides. For evaluating almost any other area of national policy—aid to education, civil rights, foreign aid—authorities are legion and resource material virtually inexhaustible. But in defense debates, the Pentagon's edge is usually insuperable. The main exception—the defeat of President Nixon's ABM plans several years ago—proves the importance of information, since it was the one time when outside experts were available and independent reports had been prepared.

Our educational resources reflect the same imbalance. A student at any decent university may take dozens of courses in sociology or international relations, but it is unlikely that he will know a CVAN from a SAM-D by the time he graduates. The resulting sense of ignorance means that outsiders rarely feel *sure* when confronting the Pentagon.

This article is an attempt to find the areas in the defense budget about which we *can* be sure. We save for

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later investigation the question of how large our international commitments should be—for example, whether we should stay in NATO. None of that is clear cut. But there are some points of certainty—specifically, that part of the defense budget is essential, and that other parts are clearly waste.

We Need the Polaris/Poseidon Submarine System

Pending the day of complete disarmament, the U. S. needs to maintain a strategic deterrent force capable of convincing any enemy that it is not worthwhile to attack first (see box below.) For the foreseeable future, the Polaris submarine fleet will serve this purpose. When the Polaris was developed during the 1960s, it was considered the least vulnerable of all our deterrents, since missile-bearing submarines are far harder for an enemy to find and destroy than are bombers or land-based missiles. Experts still feel it will take an unforeseeable technological breakthrough in anti-submarine weapons to make the

Parity, bargaining chips, and other shady deals

When it wants to get more money for our strategic systems—the "triad" of submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles that is supposed to protect us against attack by the enemy—the military resembles a cagey old lawyer who argues facts when the law is against him and law when the facts are against him. When the U. S. and Soviet forces are in rough parity, the Pentagon talks about deterrence. When we have a deterrent capability, it asks for parity. And when both parity and deterrence exist, the Pentagon stresses the need for a "bargaining chip" for use in future negotiations with the enemy.

The only militarily-sound notion is that of deterrence—the need to convince a potential enemy that even if he attacked by surprise, we would still be able to inflict heavy damage in return. Over the years, government officials have stressed that a *deterrent* force—whether or not it represents parity with Russia—is adequate.

In February, 1968, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told Congress that "in the case of the Soviet Union, I would judge that a capability to destroy, say, one fifth to one fourth of her population and one half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective deterrent." Doing this, McNamara estimated, would require 200 to 400 deliverable missiles.

Only last year President Nixon acknowledged that "the capabilities of both the U. S. and the USSR have reached a point where our programs need not be driven by fear of minor quantitative imbalances."

Nonetheless, arguments about "minor quantitative imbalances" and appeals for "bargaining chips" have inflated our strategic forces to a size far greater than that needed for effective deterrence. Already, our "triad" of strategic forces has an awesome overkill capacity: if the missiles from one of our Polaris submarines detonated on target, they could destroy one quarter of Russia's industrial capacity. There are 41 of these submarines, plus more than 500 bombers and hundreds of ICBMs. The Pentagon wants still more. While it is important to retain our deterrent capability, the concept of a "triad" is outdated and senseless. Further expansion of the system is a waste of money and a threat to the peace, since it only encourages Russia to step up its strategic programs.

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Polaris a less-than-reliable deterrent. So far, the system has performed perfectly, earning a zero-defects record.

We do, of course, need to keep the fleet modern and well-equipped. To this end, 31 of the 41 Polaris subs are being refitted with Poseidon missiles, which give the subs an effective striking range of 4,500 miles. We also need to continue intense research on anti-submarine weapons (ASW), so that we will have an idea of how close the Russian ASW forces are to developing a threat to the Polaris.

What we *don't* need is more submarines, or a different type of sub, once we have a reliable Polaris/Poseidon fleet. Nonetheless, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird went before Congress last year asking for more money to develop the new Trident submarine system, whose main advantage is its longer striking range. The rationale was not that there is any weakness in the Polaris/Poseidon system, but rather that we should keep two jumps ahead of the Soviets, who are now developing an inferior version of the Polaris called the Y-1.

When congressmen questioned the need for the Trident, Laird invoked the "bargaining-chip rationale": "It would be diplomatically and politically unacceptable for the U. S. to allow the Soviets numerical superiority in both land-based and sea-based strategic missiles." In fact, the U. S. now has an edge which the Russians must find "unacceptable": we have about 6,000 nuclear warheads in our strategic arsenal, plus another 7,000 nuclear weapons with NATO forces in Europe, compared with a total of 2,500 Soviet nuclear warheads. Still, the majority of Congress went along with Laird on the Trident, and spending for the system has risen from $100 million in 1972 to $936 million in 1973.

This year the Pentagon wants still more—$536.7 million for accelerated work on two long-range Trident missiles, plus $1.17 billion for a similar speed-up on submarines to carry them. None of this money can be justified on grounds linked to the national defense. The up-grading of the Polaris fleet through conversion to Poseidon missiles—for which another $252.6 million has been requested this year—is not yet complete. By 1978, when the Pentagon wants its first Trident in operation, the oldest Polaris will be only 18 years old, with an estimated 12 years of useful life ahead. At no time has there been a hint that the Polaris/Poseidon program is vulnerable or in danger of losing its potency as a deterrent force. And when the technical breakthrough comes that makes the Polaris vulnerable, the Trident—which would also be imperiled by anti-submarine weapons—would hardly be the correct response.

We Don't Need More Bombers

Given the adequacy of the Polaris system, the U. S. rationale for a "triad" of deterrent forces—submarines, bombers, and land-based missiles—is curious, akin to building three firehouses on the same city block. While it is not clear whether the bomber fleet should be entirely dismantled—its main justification is as a hedge against threats to the Polaris—it certainly is clear that we don't need any *more* planes.

The current U. S. strategic bomber force is made up of more than 500 B-52 bombers, 225 of which are being modernized and reequipped. The Pentagon wants to replace them with a new squadron of 244 B-1s. The question is whether there is anything the new planes can do that the old ones can't do as well. The Boeing Aircraft Company says that it can keep the B-52s going until 1990 by equipping them with new C-5 engines, at a cost of $1.7 billion. The same planes could also be fitted with SCAD decoys and SRAM missiles, whose extremely long range would mean the plane would not have to make deep penetrations of enemy air space.

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But the Air Force wants the B-1s. Specifically, it wants $473.5 million this year for B-1 research and development. The official cost estimate is $30 million per plane, but a Brookings Institution study predicts the price per plane could be $60 million, for a total program cost of $14.6 billion.

Is the B-1 worth it? A paper prepared earlier this year by the Center for Defense Information concluded that there was not enough difference between the B-1 and the updated B-52s to justify the new program. The evidence supports the conclusion that the B-1 money should be denied in this year's budget.

We Don't Need More Minuteman Missiles or ABMs

The third part of the "triad"—land-based missiles, most important of which are the 450 Minuteman 11 (single-warhead) missiles—is inherently the most vulnerable part of the system and seems to serve little purpose other than adding an extra cushion of overcapacity. There are good reasons for thinking that we could do well without any of these missiles at all. What is certain about this part of the system is that we do not need *more* of the missiles—specifically, the 550 new Minuteman 111 (multi-headed, or MIRV) missiles for which this year's request is $768.2 million. None of this money should be spent, since it only adds redundant capacity to the part of the system most likely to be destroyed in case of attack.

The recent SALT agreements, which essentially banned anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs), provide another argument against MIRVs. We need the MIRVs, the Pentagon used to say, because they are the only way we can penetrate the Soviet network of ABMs. Now that the ABMs are banned, that justification is invalid.

The ABM—a missile designed to protect the Minuteman against attack and the cause celebre of a few years back—has been limited by the SALT agreements to two sites in each country: for the U. S., Grand Forks, N. D., and Washington, D. C. Last year Congress gave DOD the money it wanted for Grand Forks' "Safeguard" ABM project but refused to appropriate money for Washington. This year the Pentagon is back, requesting another $401.5 million for Grand Forks, plus $100 million for ARBES, an ABM re-entry vehicle. There is also a curious little request for $170.1 million in research and development funds for "Site Defense." Admissions from Pentagon officials have revealed that this is just another name for the ABM site in Washington.

Apart from their strategic shortcomings, our land-based missiles should be causing us a few sleepless nights for reasons familiar from the *Dr. Strangelove* and *Fail-Safe* era a decade ago. The virtue of bombers and submarines is that the men operating them don't have the obsessive sense of sitting on a bomb all day. There are always things for them to do—steer the sub, move the periscope up and down, fly the plane, practice making takeoffs and landings, and in general perform as if they had a normal eight-hour-a-day job. In the Minuteman silos, the crew sits, looking at the missile and waiting for the buzzers to go off. The danger of mischief born from stir-craziness is clear. This is one more reason to keep us from building more missiles.

Answers to April puzzle:

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We Don't Need So Many Aircraft Carriers

The basic argument against aircraft carriers is the same as that against an expanded cavalry: both prepare us well for the kinds of wars we once fought, but they won't be much good in the future. The ships are the more expensive anachronism: each costs about $1 billion to build and requires another $2-billion worth of companion vessels (destroyers, escort ships, and anti-submarine aircraft). They are also so vulnerable to attack that they would be nearly useless in any serious conflict with the Soviet Union or, for that matter, with any country possessing a decent air force.

Further, the mere existence of the carriers tempts the Navy to use them. This often takes the form of "showing the flag" at different ports around the world, thereby twisting foreign policy in directions quite different from what the State Department or even the President has in mind. In 1969 Senator Clifford Case obtained from the Navy a list of 42 instances in which a carrier had been ordered to an area for a "show of force" or other "foreign-policy purpose" short of war. Case then presented the list to the State Department, which told him that all the initiatives were the Navy's own doing.

Some analysts claim that the Navy should keep a few carriers, perhaps a fleet of nine, so that we will retain our "flexibility" around the world. This is a dubious proposition, since those few things a carrier can do uniquely are often dangerous and, as the saying goes, carriers are floating wars waiting for a place to happen. But even if we aim for a nine-carrier fleet (down from our current 16), we would not need any new carrier construction until the end of the decade. So Congress should have no qualms about rejecting the $657-million request in this year's budget for the new CVAN-70 carrier.

Facing the fact that carriers will be useless in a war with Russia, Congress would also be able to scrap a series of other requests for carrier weaponry: the F-14A "Tomcat," the Phoenix air-to-air missile, the S-3-A "Viking" anti-submarine aircraft, and the preposterous DD-963 destroyers. The Navy should stick to the Polaris.

We Don't Need to Pay So Much for Manpower

In recent years, defense manpower costs have risen to the twilight zone between absurdity and scandal. This year it will cost $43.9 billion—56 per cent of the defense budget—to keep 2.23 million men in uniform. Five years ago, when there were 3.5 million active military personnel, manpower costs were only 42 per cent of the budget.

The increase comes from three sources: the shift to a volunteer army and the consequent rise in salaries; Congress' continuing failure to limit the benefits it votes for the military; and the bizarre, balloon-like rank structure of the Services, with its steadily increasing proportion of generals and other well-paid officers (see box on page 34).

Military benefits have become competitive with those in the outside world, as intended when the draft was ended. A recruit now receives $332 per month—plus food, shelter, medical care, and other benefits; only five years ago, the salary was $144 per month. In addition to increases that come with promotions, the soldier receives automatic pay hikes for each year spent in the Service. And—thanks to a rider pushed through in 1967 by the late Rep. L. Mendel Rivers—the military man gets a raise whenever civil service employees get one. After 20 years' service, the soldier can retire and collect a pension equal to 75 per cent of his highest pay. This pension is also protected against inflation, rising four per cent each time the cost of living goes up three per cent.

When all this is put together, it reaches some quite astonishing totals. George Wilson of *The Washington Post* has calculated that if current

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trends continue, a private entering the Service today and retiring as a first sergeant at age 38 can expect to receive $325,782 during his 20 years of active duty, and another $1,373,788 between the time he retires and the age of 75. The prediction may be excessive, since it assumes constant inflation at the high rates we've recently seen, but it gives us an idea of the problem.

Retirement benefits are even higher if the soldier successfully claims "disability" and therefore qualifies for tax-free disability pay. Last December a House Armed Services subcommittee chaired by Rep. Samuel Stratton found that between 1964 and 1972, 40 per cent of the general officers retiring from the Army and Marine Corps, and 30 per cent of the Navy's flag officers, successfully claimed disabilities. In the Air Force the figure was an astonishing 53 per cent—although 77 per cent of these men had been certified for flight pay within six months of retirement. Flight pay is itself a scandal. According to a recent report released by the General Accounting Office, the Pentagon pays $76 million each year in flight pay to 30,000 people in non-flying jobs.

And if this were not enough, the Administration is now proposing a "recomputation" scheme that promises to be one of the biggest cost-overruns in military history. Under the plan, retired servicemen's pensions would be based on the new, higher pay scales for the military, rather than what they actually earned while in uniform. Stratton's subcommittee has estimated that recomputation plans would have cumulative costs of between $17 billion and $170 billion by the year 2000; even without recomputation, military pensions are expected to reach an annual cost of $21.6 billion by the end of the century.

Promoting everyone

Vietnam may have been a time of anguish for most Americans, but it was a time of promise, opportunity, and promotion for military careerists. There were more four-star generals and admirals leading the 2.5-million-man military establishment in 1972 than there were in 1945, when 12 million Americans were in uniform. Last year a House Armed Services subcommittee chaired by Rep. Otis Pike found that while the present military has 315,000 fewer men than after demobilization in 1946, there are now 26,000 more captains, 21,000 more majors, 15,000 more lieutenant colonels, and 4,000 more colonels. There are also 43,000 fewer second lieutenants and 77,000 fewer first lieutenants.

The same pattern applies to career non-commissioned officers. In June, 1971, there were fewer E-1s (the lowest rank) than E-2s, and fewer E-2s than E-3s, and fewer E-3s than E-4s. In 1946, in each case, the opposite was true. The Navy now has eight E-5s for every E-1.

When it came to actually fighting, the careerists' record was not so good. Pike's subcommittee reported: "As of July 31, 1971, of the total casualties of 45,420, 4,730 were officers and 40,690 were enlisted men. Of enlisted deaths in Vietnam, in the Army 76.4 per cent were E-4s and below. In the Marine Corps 87.7 per cent of the enlisted deaths held grades of E-4 or below. In other words, of those killed in Vietnam, over two thirds had served in the Armed Forces for less than two years. The conclusion that can logically be reached is that career personnel receive the promotions, while the less-than-two-year servicemen were the victims who died while engaging the enemy."

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We Don't Need the Cushion of Support

For every one of our soldiers serving in a combat position, two others are in the rear, cooking meals, processing forms, or performing some other support function. This ratio in the Soviet army is about 1 to 1—the same as ours at the end of World War II. Much of the increase in our support ratio has come recently; soon after the height of the Vietnam war in 1968, the number of support personnel rose quickly.

Altogether, support costs now make up about one third of the defense budget. A Brookings Institution report estimated last year that if we cut the support ratio back to its 1968 level, we could save $2.5 billion.

In part, the higher support ratios reflect a more technically advanced army which puts fewer men on the front lines. But they reflect something else, too. The new recruiting posters—which show a sunburnt youth lolling on a Hawaiian beach or an off-duty soldier prowling European cafes—are not as deceptive as they seem. The military now does a travel-bureau business that congressional junketeers might well envy. Last year the average serviceman was "permanently" relocated once every 10 months. This year some 2.2 million "permanent" moves are planned—about one for every man in uniform. Not only do these transfers cost $2 billion themselves, but they also force the Pentagon to hire an extra 90,000 soldiers to fill in for those in transit at any one moment.

The abundance of unnecessary military bases also swells support costs. In 1972 some 556 major defense installations were in operation, in the U. S. and abroad, at a total cost of $8 billion. A great many are of no strategic military importance—so many, in fact, that former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard has estimated that we could save $1 billion if we closed bases "without regard to non-military considerations." These extra considerations, of course, include each congressman's desire to maintain a base in his own district.

Another form of military "support"—the National Guard and Reserve units, which during the Vietnam war provided succor to the men who were lucky enough to get in—is growing steadily more expensive. This year the Pentagon wants $4.4 billion for these units, up from $2.6 billion only four years ago. While the National Guard played an important role during the national mail strike several years back (not to mention its campus activities during the late sixties), Rep. Otis Pike's view of the situation is probably fair: "Somewhere in this country there may be Reserve and Guard units dedicated, highly motivated, and ready to go. . . but I've never seen one."

Since support costs are harder to clothe in technical jargon than are missile programs or tanks, the Pentagon has found another way to protect them. At budget-drafting time, when each military department lists the areas where cuts can be made if necessary, the Army and the Navy usually offer to sacrifice their combat divisions, but not their support units. The combat units, of course, are precisely the items that the Secretary of Defense and his friends in the Capitol will refuse to cut, and so the entire package is safe.

Stopping the Minuteman and the carriers will not take all the fat out of the Pentagon budget, but it may be the only way for us to start considering what our defense needs really are. Until we peel off these outer wrappings, it is hard to get an idea of whether the other systems are doing any good or not. The fight against those pockets of waste will be more successful if liberals realize that there are some parts of the defense budget which we *do* need, at least until the day when we get a genuine disarmament agreement. Once we admit that the Polaris—and ASW research—are necessary, we may be closer to convincing Congress that some other systems are a waste. ■

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MEMO of the Month

MEMO SLIP — Never Use for Approvals, Disapprovals, Concurrences, or Similar Actions

TO	INITIALS	ACTION
1 Tina Stonorov, Exec Sec Alaska Conservation Society		CIRCULATE
	DATE	COORDINATION
2		FILE
		INFORMATION
3		NOTE AND RETURN
		PER CONVERSATION
4		SEE ME
		SIGNATURE

REMARKS

Due to an administrative error, the original of the attached letter was forwarded to you. A new original has been accomplished and forwarded to AAC/JA (Alaskan Air Command, Judge Advocate office). Please place this carbon copy in your files and destroy the original.

FROM: John W. Campbell
JOHN W. CAMPBELL
Deputy Base Civil Engineer

DATE: 15 Feb 73

PHONE: 377-5213

DD FORM 1 OCT 60 95 Replaces DD Form 94, 1 Feb 50, and DD Form 95, 1 Feb 50, which will be used until exhausted. ☆ GPO : 1968 O - 295-058

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A radical proposal: free enterprise

by Michael Rappeport and Christine Van Lenter

Apart from Jean-Jacques Servain-Schreiber and a few partisans at the head of business conglomerates, the giant corporation has won few friends. Workers on the assembly line detest the speed-ups and monotony which corporate efficiency experts dictate; consumers cite factory-produced food as an example of what's wrong with life; small entrepreneurs disappear with alarming rapidity; and the ancient political warnings about the influence of private interests have been bolstered by evidence from Chile and the Nixon Administration. Even economists admit that corporate growth has passed the stage at which it made purely economic sense: there is, for example, no economically sound reason for ITT to be running car rental agencies or baking bread.

The traditional weapons for fighting corporate growth have proved exceedingly weak and ineffective. And the Justice Department's cumbersome and time-consuming procedures guarantee that even if an administration pursued trust-busting policies with a will, it would have a hard time making headway. The few times that the government has ordered divestiture, the timetables have been so drawn out that their impact is not felt for years.

A better idea might be to build into the tax system a disincentive to growth-for-its-own-sake. This might not stop all mergers and acquisitions, for the urge to grandeur is inherent in business as elsewhere and will prevail despite tax obstacles. But at least it would remove the present tax incentive in favor of conglomeration.

Under current tax laws, the corporate tax is only crudely progressive. The first $25,000 of profits is taxed at a rate of 22 per cent, and everything above that is taxed at 48 per cent. A corporation netting $1 billion is taxed at the same rate as one making $100,000. And while 48 per cent of $1 billion is much more than 48 per cent of $100,000, the amount that is left over is so much greater for the big company that its effect on the marketplace (not to mention on the world of politics) is of an entirely different magnitude.

As an alternative, we might consider a system which taxes corporate profit at progressive rates like those in effect for personal income. Table I shows a proposed set of rates.

What would this accomplish? For one thing, businesses that had expanded or merged merely to show a larger overall profit would find much of that incentive taken away. Many of them might find it more profitable to break up into smaller, independent, operating companies. On the other hand, if there were truly compelling economic reasons for an expansion, the company would go ahead with its plans since it would gain more than it would lose in taxes.

The effects of a new tax system, while hard to predict with certainty or precision, might be extremely beneficial in a few important areas. Its impact on the capital market, for example, might create opportunities for more innovative, small-scale operations.

Since corporate growth would carry the drawback of higher tax

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rates, managers would be more likely to pay out profits to stockholders and less likely to retain and reinvest them.* This would then put more money in the hands of private investors, and leave less lodged with the moneymen of Western Electric or Ford. It would be wrong to expect the millenium based on this one change, but prospects should certainly improve for the individualistic, high-risk ventures that are the heart of the free enterprise system. Making capital more available to the man with a patent idea or the group ready to start a new business would not only give us the benefits of individual energies that are not now fulfilled, but would also lead toward a society with more of the individualized jobs and fewer in the large enterprises.

An even more significant effect may be the new tax's impact on the depersonalization and ennui of working life. By itself, a new tax structure might not change the assembly-line blues, since breaking GM into five or six companies would probably not alter the basic production technique. But it might change part of the corporate atmosphere that makes things like the Vega assembly line possible. When organizations reach a certain size, the people within them can no longer feel the sense of responsibility and participation that is necessary for excellence, or even decency, in their work. Bigness is not always bad, nor smallness good, but it does seem clear that the sense of participation is more likely to flourish in the small enterprise. Recent trends in the publishing industry have amply demonstrated this phenomenon. As the small, independent houses have been gobbled up one by one by big corporations, the editorial staff's sense of integrity and purpose has been threatened. From her personal observations of what happened when Random House was taken over by RCA, Suzannah Lessard has written:

> The first principle of corporate structure is to diffuse responsibility so that no one person feels directly implicated by the whole, while the sum of individual energies perpetuates the institution in all its endeavors. The corporation has neither a conscience nor a self-consciousness. If you are a successful editor, the profits you might make publishing excellent, conscientious books can serve to grease another part of the organization in an activity you abhor.

A recent book, *Public Administration as Political Process*, reports that most Americans work for large bureaucracies: GM, and the Post Office each employs more than 700,000 people. As more and more of us become part of the corporate grease, a progressive corporate tax may seem more and more attractive.

*A change in the capital gains tax rate, which encourages stockholders to prefer reinvestment to dividends, would also be a step in the right direction.

Table I

Taxable Income	Tax Paid at current rates	Suggested Tax Rate	Tax Paid at new rates
below $25,000	$0.7 billion	25%	$0.7 billion
$25,000-100,000	$3.0	30%	$1.8
$100,000-1 million	$4.9	36%	$3.6
$1 million-3 million	$1.9	42%	$1.5
$3 million-10 million	$3.1	46%	$2.9
$10 million-25 million	$3.6	50%	$3.6
$25 million-100 million	$4.0	54%	$4.3
over $100 million	$14.4	58%	$17.2
	$35.6 billion		$35.6 billion

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The hero of a year ago

by Ted Van Dyk

It won't be long now until Theodore White and the other campaign chroniclers give us their versions of what happened to George McGovern in 1972.

Teddy White, the public's favorite on this sort of thing, will undoubtedly report in his book the conclusions he told me he'd reached last fall: first, that the national mood was more in tune with Nixon than McGovern; and second, that McGovern should have made "the crisis of the American city" the central issue of his campaign.

The campaign alumni, in their books, will unsurprisingly cast themselves as both protagonists and heroes, unconnected with any of the major errors behind the disaster.

We've long since had George McGovern's own explanations: he was too moral; the people were't ready for him; and the press was soft on Nixon.

Dick Dougherty, McGovern's normally-sensible campaign press secretary, has also faulted the press, at least the working press. Most of them personally favored McGovern, he said in an article in *Newsweek*; thus they should have adopted the subjectivity of the "new journalism" and expressed their preference. Joseph Kraft, in his syndicated column, has several times stressed the explanation he developed last October. Too many ex-journalists were involved in the McGovern campaign, he says, and everyone knows that journalists (presumably excepting Joe Kraft) are not qualified to make serious judgments or run a presidential campaign.

Gary Hart, the nominal campaign manager, has offered other reasons for the debacle. They were, in order: Hubert Humphrey (for attacking McGovern's $1,000-per-citizen plan in California); Tom Eagleton (for being Tom Eagleton); and Arthur Bremer (for shooting George Wallace, who might otherwise have run as a third-party candidate and taken votes from Nixon). Sometimes he adds Ed Muskie (for not withdrawing from the Democratic race as early as Hart thinks he should have).

A favorite villain has been Gordon Weil, McGovern's executive assistant and traveling companion, who has been blamed for suggesting the ill-fated $1,000-for-everyone scheme and for inadequately checking out Tom Eagleton in Miami Beach. Political pollsters Richard Scamman and Ben Wattenberg have told us that, despite their warnings, McGovern strayed too far from the ideological center. Al

Ted Van Dyk was Director of Issues and Research for the McGovern-Shriver campaign.

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Barkan of COPE claims McGovern lost because he was anti-labor. The White House strategists now say that, because of his overseas triumphs in Peking and Moscow, Nixon would have beaten any Democrat in 1972, although McGovern was the candidate of their dreams.

These explanations remind me of what happened at a campaign staff meeting a few days before the November election. Hart, leaning back in his swivel chair, grandly pronounced for the umpteenth time the Humphrey-Eagleton-Bremer-Muskie Blame Theory: "You know, if George McGovern loses this election, there are several people to blame, etc., etc. And, believe me, we'll settle up with them afterward."

I turned to Lee White who was running Sargent Shriver's vice presidential campaign, and asked: "Lee, did George McGovern or any of us have anything to do with all of this?"

"Apparently not," Lee said. "It must have been all those other guys."

I think I probably had as good a vantage point as anyone for observing the campaign. Having worked for Hubert Humphrey in both the 1964 and 1968 campaigns, and served as his assistant in the period between, I had hoped he would not be a candidate in 1972. A Humphrey candidacy in '72 felt, would only reopen the Democratic Party's '68 wounds. I also felt it would needlessly expose Humphrey to undeserved abuse. In conversation in the spring of 1971, he said he tended to agree.

What the Democratic Party clearly needed was a candidate who could bridge the gap between the 1968 peace activists and regular Democrats. I felt that McGovern, whose peace credentials were good but who also had been the first to join Humphrey after his nomination on the Chicago platform, could best do that. He had, after all, begun his political career as a full-time Party organizer in South Dakota.

Thus, from June, 1971, until July, 1972, I served George McGovern on a volunteer basis—offering counsel, raising money, overseeing his campaigns in several primary states, and, then, at the July convention, managing his efforts at the platform sessions. After the convention, I served as full-time director of issues and research for the McGovern-Shriver general campaign.

From Inattention to Adulation

"Some people have told me that I ought to declare my candidacy right now," McGovern said to me late in 1970, during one brief meeting at his office. What do you think?

I told him I thought it was a bad idea. If he wanted to run, certainly he ought to be the first liberal candidate to declare—thereby preempting money and support that might go to other liberals. But, I said, he could still do that many months hence. Why not conduct the "unannounced" campaign usual at such an early stage?

A month later, 15 months before the first 1972 primary, McGovern formally declared his candidacy. He was probably right to do so.

The Senator personally wrote a long letter of declaration and sent it to the hundreds of thousands of people on the mailing list left over from fund appeals for the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment to end the war. (There was some question as to whether the list was McGovern's or belonged equally to all the Amendment's sponsors, but McGovern solved that simply by using it as his own.)

The result was phenomenal. The receipts from that letter and subsequent mailings to the same list kept the McGovern campaign alive throughout all of 1971.

It's forgotten now, but back in mid- and late-1971, Harold Hughes, Birch Bayh, Fred Harris, William Proxmire, John Lindsay, and Shirley Chisholm (not to mention Edmund Muskie or Hubert Humphrey) were running ahead, close behind, or even with George McGovern in the national political polls. The difference was that

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they didn't have the mailing list and the money it brought in. One by one they dropped out, leaving only Lindsay and Chisholm to compete with McGovern and the "serious" candidates in the primaries.

Then came the New Hampshire primary, which the pundits would later call a masterstroke of McGovern political strategy. The fact is we were there because we had no choice.

Florida was expensive, inhospitable, and had too many candidates. Prospects in Illinois also looked bad. Wisconsin, on April 7, offered us our best chance. But, to do decently there, we would have to make a good showing somewhere else. Everyone with the exception of Gary Hart (who, after traveling through the primary states, suggested all-out efforts in both Florida and Illinois) agreed that we should begin in New Hampshire.

On Sunday, January 9, we convened a last-ditch meeting of major financial contributors at McGovern's home in Washington. Would they see us through New Hampshire? The mailing-list money was no longer enough. Several of us, and then McGovern himself, painted bright pictures of the victories ahead—if only we could finance the next two months.

At the end of the meeting, McGovern, standing at the head of the room, made a direct appeal for funds. There was a long moment of silence as each of the potential donors watched the others for some sign of commitment. After several moments of nervous shifting and throat-clearing by all present, Max Palevsky of Los Angeles pledged $150,000, almost half the amount finally raised that day. Later, Palevsky was to abandon the campaign over a policy dispute. But on that January Sunday, at least, he had kept it alive.

Crying for Joy

In New Hampshire itself, both Joseph Grandmaison, the state campaign manager, and Hart said the only



chance for votes lay with the Boston commuters living in the southern part of the state and the remnants of the 1968 McCarthy peace activists. But McGovern kept insisting that these two groups couldn't produce enough votes for a victory. Finally, in mid-February, he overruled the advisers and plunged handshaking into the shoe factories of Manchester. Grandmaison's young canvassers covered every household—talking with the families, writing personal follow-up notes, then calling back again.

The race was settled when Ed Muskie hired a flatbed truck and set it up outside William Loeb's newspaper office.

Looking back, it's hard to say whether McGovern's surprisingly strong showing in New Hampshire was due to his personal campaigning in regular-Democratic, blue-collar areas and to the thorough canvass, or to Muskie's tears. Probably some of both. There were many sighs of relief that, when Muskie's campaign collapsed in New Hampshire, George Wallace, Scoop Jackson, Hubert Humphrey, and John Lindsay were not on the ballot to share in the

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windfall.

Our sole objective in Florida was to head off John Lindsay, which we did, running (at a meager six per cent) less than a percentage point behind him. We also fared miserably in Illinois, losing heavily to Muskie in the delegate contest. But New Hampshire was still enough to keep the campaign alive.

Then came Wisconsin, where everything worked.

Gene Pokorny, who coordinated our primary campaign in Wisconsin, had been intensely organizing the state for months. Humphrey, after Florida the odds-on front-runner, unaccountably spent more time in California, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and other states than he did in Wisconsin. A new wave of fighting broke out in Vietnam just one week before the primary, pushing the peace issue forward. McGovern struck a receptive chord with his pledge to lower property taxes, and Republican crossover votes went to him in large numbers.

And the press, increasingly bored with the primaries, had a good story. Suddenly, the obscure man whose chances could not be taken seriously, became the fresh Prairie Populist, moving from news magazine covers into the hearts of the people in his quest for a more decent and moral politics. From Wisconsin until the California primary, the press treated McGovern to an uncritical free ride and the financial and organizational advantages that flowed from it—the likes of which presidential politics had never seen, except, perhaps, in Eisenhower's 1952 honeymoon period.

And with the tidal wave of publicity came a tidal wave of money. After Wisconsin, we were able to outspend each of the remaining Democratic contenders by as much as 5 to 1.

Some of this reward from press and public was deserved. McGovern had worked his heart out for 16 months, earning little but derision from politicians and commentators. But in Wisconsin, he had become the "Candidate in Full Voice and Stride." attaining that state-of-being a candidate so seldom reaches, in which he is confidently and fully in tune with the electorate. With its talent for hyperbole, the press transformed this performance into a New Messiah version of McGovern that bore little relation to the facts. He was, essentially, a man on a hot streak.

One had to sympathize with the complaints of Ed Muskie, whom the press all but counted out after Wisconsin. And how, in reality, had Muskie done? He'd finished 10 percentage points ahead of McGovern in New

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Hampshire, and 3 points ahead of McGovern in Florida; he had won the Illinois delegate contest, 59 to 4. Wisconsin was, in fact, the first primary in four where Muskie had not made a better showing than McGovern.

Shaky on the Issues

Muskie's decline was generally viewed as the result of his vague stands on the issues: who could say what Muskie thought about the war, or how he would change the welfare system? McGovern, by contrast, was in these early days building a reputation as *the* issue-oriented candidate. In the press reports, his slow rise was linked to shifting public attitudes—on the war, on moral standards, on the tax and welfare systems. And so, when McGovern's policy stands turned out to be only slightly better researched or thought out than those of, say, Sam Yorty, the shock was greater than it would have been for other candidates.

Most of these policy stands were in the form of position papers issued early in the campaign. These papers were directed primarily toward the 1968 Kennedy and McCarthy supporters, whom we expected to be the base of any McGovern organizational and financial effort. Their main purpose was to dispel the impression that he was a "one-issue" candidate.

One booklet, "McGovern on the Issues," was widely distributed; it looked quite authoritative but consisted largely of McGovern quotations and lists of bills the Senator had co-sponsored. The policy papers themselves, with the exception of an "Alternate Defense Budget," prepared under the direction of McGovern's legislative assistant, John Holum, were largely rehashes of long-standing Democratic doctrine, quickly put together by Holum and Gordon Weil. One paper, dealing with income redistribution and tax reform, was drafted entirely by Weil. It offered a number of policy alternatives, including the oft-proposed idea of "an annual federal payment to every citizen." One possibility, it said, might involve a $1,000-per-person payment. Then it examined other suggestions.

The general assignment reporters—who during the early stages are the *only* reporters covering a presidential campaign—paid little attention to what was in the policy papers. Instead, they began propagating the idea that, as it usually was expressed, "McGovern proposed an unprecedented number of detailed and specific programs to meet the nation's needs."

In fact, the policy papers were thin, and McGovern's first-hand expertise was largely limited to Vietnam and the hunger issue. His background, even his Senate committee assignments, had simply not given him much exposure to the subtle problems of economics, race, and urban affairs.

Few presidential candidates, in-

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cluding John Kennedy in 1960, have really known all the issues as they entered a campaign. I, for one, had no question of McGovern's instincts or his ability to ultimately master what he didn't already know. But the gaps were there.

We were getting our free ride in the media largely because McGovern was good copy—the nice-guy underdog coming out of nowhere—and the familiar Humphrey and Muskie were dull. And we were getting our hearty organizational and financial support from 1968 McCarthy and Kennedy supporters rallying to the flag of the unfinished peace cause.

But the campaign's strength with the voters lay in its sense, if you will, of anti-politics.

The Middle Americans who gave McGovern their votes in places like New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Southern California certainly were not doing so because they shared his affection for long-haired students or his mildly progressive views on amnesty, abortion, or marijuana. Our private polls told us that few, in fact, knew those views. (In Florida, for instance, voters surveyed rated McGovern "more conservative" than any of the candidates except Wallace and Jackson.) Rather, they saw and heard him as an honest man who, whatever his views on the issues, could be *trusted.*

In personal appearances and in television commercials produced by Charles Guggenheim, George McGovern *listened* as much as he talked. If you watched the Guggenheim commercials and turned the sound off, you saw factory workers, housewives, farmers, old people—all with their lips moving. You saw George McGovern nodding, agreeing, giving the camera an earnest profile—his lips not moving until the very end. If you turned on the sound, you heard the citizens complaining about their problems; then, you heard McGovern briefly telling them that they were right. When you spoke about unfair taxes, he *heard* you. When you worried about drug problems in your children's high school, you saw the worry in his face. As he campaigned, McGovern always stopped to ask a few questions of each voter, looking him straight in the eye, instead of grasping his hand and looking ahead to the next man with a *pro forma* "How are you?"

He was not a George Wallace, who was different from the others because he angrily shouted his brand of Poujadist "truth." George McGovern was different because he appeared not to be identified with the old programs, promises, and failures, and because he really seemed to respond to the individual's concerns. Each voter, in a sense, was being offered an empty canvas on which he could create the McGovern portrait of his choice. The appeal was calculated and manipulative. But it was also a relatively accurate portrayal of McGovern's candidacy.

There were position papers for the few who cared about such things. But even if the Senator didn't know all the answers, he did sincerely want to listen to the homely problems of ordinary people (like those he'd grown up with). Exhausted by a generation of overblown speeches and promises, those people didn't necessarily expect him to have the answers. The caring was something in itself.

If George McGovern could have faced Richard Nixon sometime between the Wisconsin and California primaries, he might well have won. But then the honeymoon began to end.

The Fall From Grace

First, Scoop Jackson, moving through Nebraska a week before the primary there, raised and distorted the "acid, amnesty, and abortion" issues.

Then came the Humphrey-McGovern showdown in California. On the morning of the first TV debate between them in Los Angeles, McGovern

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sent Humphrey flowers (it was his birthday) and then phoned him. "I called Hubert," McGovern said with a sly grin, "and he told me he'd have to be nice to me after all that kindness." A few hours later I saw one of the McGovern children in tears (the Humphreys and McGoverns had been next-door neighbors in Chevy Chase, Maryland, for several years) after watching Humphrey's all-out attack on the $1,000 plan and the Alternate Defense Budget. Humphrey's uncharacteristic assault took McGovern by surprise, and McGovern counterattacked on Humphrey's Vietnam record. The exchange marked a change in the way the public, led by the press, viewed McGovern's campaign. Many of the gaps and improvisations that had seemed insignificant before would now be examined more closely.

One of the most serious deficiencies was, of course, the choice of a vice-presidential candidate. In early April, riding in his car in Philadelphia, McGovern had asked me what I thought about a possible running mate. I gave him two names and the reasons why. I supposed he was asking others the same question. It was encouraging, in any case, to know that he was thinking seriously about it, although his own candidacy, at that point, was still a long shot.

Then, in mid-June, when McGovern seemed an almost-certain nominee, I went to New Orleans to represent him at the National Conference of Mayors. On the final day of the conference McGovern flew down to deliver a speech on urban affairs. Both Muskie and Humphrey, speaking earlier in the day, had received far warmer receptions from the mayors. But that was to be expected—Muskie had served for years on the Intergovernmental Relations Commission and Humphrey, formerly a mayor himself, had been the Johnson Administration's principal champion of urban interests. Despite the cool reception, McGovern was enthusiastically confident as he left the conference that day—most of all, he told me, because "I'm absolutely sure that, if I'm nominated, I'll get Teddy. I know it. And, if he's on the ticket, I'm certain I can beat Nixon." He slapped his fist into his palm for emphasis. Then he moved on to talk about the platform and post-convention campaign organization.

I was encouraged. I was surprised to hear that Kennedy was available—everything flowing from his friends had indicated to the contrary—but I assumed McGovern had good reason to know that it was so.

Then came the chaos of Miami Beach. Ted Kennedy, it turned out, would not serve after all. Nor would others. With only an hour left until a name had to be formally placed on the nominating petitions, McGovern suddenly turned to Tom Eagleton, one of a half-dozen people submitted to him for consideration earlier in the day. The rest we know. (I, for one, have no idea whether McGovern was simply pipe-dreaming about Kennedy's availability, or whether he had good reason to think it was real. In any case, the idea served to block consideration of alternatives from his mind.)

Even at the convention, where Middle America saw its Richard Daley ousted and its deepest moral beliefs challenged, a McGovern victory in November still seemed possible. A month later, it did not.

Within a few days it all came apart. In rapid succession there were the Eagleton disclosures; "1,000 per cent"; the tragicomic search for a new running mate; Pierre Salinger, the diplomat-negotiator and the confusion of explanations about his role; McGovern's comparison of Nixon to Hitler; his prediction in a press conference of a probable Vietcong victory; and, with everything else going wrong, the petty fights within the campaign organization.

Worn thin from months of campaigning, still off balance from the convention credentials challenge and the Eagleton episode, McGovern lurched from one crisis of credibility

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to another.

By late August, a majority of Americans polled reported that they considered Nixon, trickster of yore, the far more trustworthy of the two candidates.

It was about then that Pat Caddell, the campaign's young pollster, burst into my office with the news that "we're only behind by four points in Ohio!" "Where was the poll taken," asked Salinger, who'd just returned from an Ohio speaking date, "in our Ohio campaign headquarters?" (We finished, finally, 21 points behind Nixon in Ohio.)

What Did It All Mean?

I knew it was over for sure the first week in October, when the letters and phone calls to headquarters abruptly dropped off.

Yet the campaign was, I am convinced, of some lasting value.

McGovern proved, in both primary and non-primary states, that individual citizens can still make a great deal of difference in the electoral process. I expect that in 1976 the nominating procedure will be much more open because of McGovern's campaign.

But perhaps the greatest contribution will prove to be the cathartic the campaign has provided to the Democratic Party. I have no doubt that if a more traditional Democrat had been nominated and then defeated, the cries would have gone up blaming the loss on our abandonment of "new politics" for the old. Between 1968 and 1972, all elements of the Party have had their chance—and all have lost. There is hardly any need for further mutual recrimination.

But there is a danger that Democratic officeholders and candidates will misread 1972 as a public rejection not of the person of George McGovern, temporarily overwhelmed by circumstance and events, but of the very premise that men and political parties should actively attempt to redress social injustice.

The McGovern disaster, after all, did *not* bury many of the non-incumbent liberal Democrats who shared the ticket with him. In Colorado Nixon defeated McGovern by 28 percentage points, but Floyd Haskell unseated Republican Senator Gordon Allott. In Delaware Nixon beat McGovern by more than 20 points, but unknown Democrat Joseph Biden upset Senator J. Caleb Boggs. In Illinois Nixon won by 19 points, but Dan Walker nonetheless defeated Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie. In Iowa it was Nixon by 17 points, yet Dick Clark turned out incumbent Senator Jack Miller by 11 points. And so on, at all levels of the ballot.

It seems to me that Richard Nixon won in 1972 because people thought he offered competence while they thought McGovern did not. And what the people wanted in 1972, in my judgment, is what they still want and do not have: political leadership which not only will make government more responsive to the needs of the individual citizen, but will devise a more satisfactory relationship between the two.

Senator William Fulbright, discussing McGovern's misfortunes with a half-dozen fellow Democrats one evening late in the campaign, said he wanted a McGovern presidency "because George is such an *ordinary man*. . . . I don't mean ordinary in any negative sense, but the presidency was *designed* for ordinary men—not for a succession of so many larger-than-life men on horseback. If George McGovern were President he wouldn't stand for a CIA or FBI pushing people around the way they do now, or the Pentagon building and buying what it pleased. He wouldn't stand for price-fixing or these outrages against people who work for wages and pay their taxes. And you can be damned sure he wouldn't try to prove his manhood by prolonging a war that shouldn't have been started in the first place. It's a damned shame all this has happened to George, because I don't know how long it will be until we have a President who feels like that." ■

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MEANWHILE THE REALITIES

"I don't walk around with jobs in my pocket"

We use the term "Meanwhile the Realities" to describe a certain type of article, one focusing on what is really happening down at the grass-roots level, below the 18 administrative layers of federal agencies, down where people pick up their food stamps and pay their taxes. In our book, Inside the System, *we gave this introduction to a section entitled "Meanwhile the Realities":*

The study of government almost exclusively concerns itself with how people have given or lent their power to their elected representatives and how those chosen few have dealt, shuffled, and redealt that power among themselves. The disparity between government and those it affects is perpetuated in the way we learn about government and compounded when the products of this type of education become bureaucrats or politicians and ignore in practice what they were taught to ignore in theory.

The purpose of "Meanwhile the Realities" lies not only in its subject matter, but in its point of view as well. Looking up from below (for example, from a coal miner's position rather than that of a GS-18 in the Bureau of Mines) is not a very comfortable posture, but it is a necessary one for scholars and officials. Government will never be improved by rearranging its brain cells while the nerve endings remain numb.

And that is why we are beginning "Meanwhile the Realities" as a regular feature.

by Polly Toynbee

In one corner of a big, airlessly-hot, open-plan office, Myer Waxler, a shambling man in his late thirties, sits hunched in his chair, sleepy-looking, like the other occupants of the room. On the third floor of the District of Columbia Manpower Administration is the room marked Student Services Division, a place with no character and no windows where there are many desks, no privacy, an air of boredom, nail filing, and paper shuffling. Some of the desks are empty a good deal of the time, but Myer Waxler is always sitting in his corner, looking deceptively bored, until galvanized into a sudden bout of energy by the appearance of a client.

The function of the office is to find jobs for young people under 18. In fact, a good many of the clients are well over that age. The others in the room avoid interviewing the kids; Waxler avoids doing anything else. He keeps few work files and hasn't much idea how many people he sees in a year. He is supposed to be a job placement officer, fitting each kid into a slot, filling out forms, trying to make the employment figures for the District look a little better. But he is a maverick, a freak in the system, and he is pretty sure that the higher authorities have no idea what he really does.

As Waxler and I were talking, a tall, dapper black youth came in and leaned across Waxler's desk, but didn't say anything.

"Well, what are you doing here?" Waxler asked angrily. With one finger the boy pulled at the bright-white, woolly hat that came down to his eyes. He was wearing a tight-fitting velvet jacket, exquisitely cut, matching his dark brushed-cotton trousers, not a mark or a seam or a crease out of place.

"I couldn't make it Wednesday, I guess," he said, his finger still picking at the rim of his hat.

"Couldn't make it, huh? You have such a tight schedule you just couldn't fit it in?" Waxler said with a sneer in

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his voice, reaching for a cigarette but not offering one to the youth, who was eyeing the packet. Waxler slowly lit the cigarette and then said, "This young lady is from England. She's a writer, and she's going to put you in the magazines, on TV, in the movies, and she's going to make you a star. You know that? You believe that?"

"Nope," said the boy, shaking his head slowly as he looked at me.

"You know where England is? You got any idea?"

"Nope."

"Is it in this country? Is it a part of the United States?"

"Nope."

"Well, at least you know *that*." Waxler waved him to a chair. "This is Maurice. He's 17 and just come from Cedar Knoll, the reformatory."

Maurice was shifting about in his seat and interrupted, "I just want you to call Mr. Baker. He said for you to call him. He said if I don't get a job he's gonna put me back in Cedar Knoll."

Maurice had been given "extended home leave" on condition that he report regularly to his probation officer and get a job—a tall order for a 17-year-old black in the District.

"So, you just want me to get that man off your back? You want me to get the pressure off you?"

"I want a job. And I want you to call Mr. Baker."

"Mr. Baker, Mr. Baker, is that all you can think about? Now is he really putting the pressure on you, or do you think you might be imagining it?"

"NO, I ain't imagining nothing."

"Shall I call Mr. Baker, then, and get him to take the pressure off you? Is that what you really want? Maybe you'll fall apart without that pressure? Are you sure you can handle it without that?"

"Yep," Maurice replied with a slight nod and half a smile. All along he had been a little confused, not knowing whether Waxler was kidding him along.

"Maybe I could get you into Job Corps?" (Job Corps is a training program that takes people out of their environment to another part of the country and trains them for six months or a year—the last remaining federally financed vocational training program, and an unpopular one.)

"No, I just came from an institution, and I don't want to go in another," Maurice said, pulling at the red check scarf around his neck.

Waxler sat back in his chair, blew out his cheeks, and sighed. "This is a situation where some training would be good, but there just isn't any. It's all frozen out." He leaned forward and picked up the telephone, and at this Maurice relaxed a little. But the line was busy and he couldn't get through.

"Cedar Knoll," Waxler said, "that's just a place that keeps you asleep all day long, total lethargy. What is it that they think down there? That when you come out, a breath of fresh, cold air is going to blow you awake?" Maurice smiled and shook his head, and Waxler went on. "If you 'adjust' to those institutions like they say you should, you won't ever adjust to the outside world. It's a no-win situation," he said, lifting the phone again. The line was still busy.

"Now listen, do you *really* want a job?"

"Yeah, I want a job. That's why I'm here. You call Mr. Baker and tell him."

"Forget Mr. Baker. Do you want a job? Mr. Baker isn't going to be enough motivation for you to hold down any job."

"I want a job."

"What job do you want?"

"I dunno, anything."

"Anything? Scrubbing toilets down in the Greyhound station?"

"Nope, I don't want to scrub no toilets."

"You just contradicted yourself."

"I'll do anything, but no toilets."

"What, then? Tell me what you want to do, what you'd *really* like to do. I'll tell you—you can't. Then tell me what you're willing to do and we'll see."

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Cartoons from a booklet distributed to students in D.C. public schools.

Maurice could think of nothing and shrugged. He wasn't going to reveal his fantasies in the face of sarcasm.

"Do you understand what a job involves? You gotta get up at seven in the morning, and that's even if you were out at a party 'til two. You want a lunch box? Your mother ain't gonna give you no lunch box. She's gonna tell you to go out and buy your own. And she ain't gonna give you no bus money neither. Now, you feel real bad at seven in the morning and your mother is screaming at you for running too much water. Then, when you get to work, your boss has just been hit on the head by his wife, and who do you think he's going to take that out on? YOU. And he's going to give you hell, because you count for just nothing in his book. He shouts, and then you shout back. Or no, you won't even dare shout back. You'll just walk out. You just won't go back there next day."

"I won't do that," Maurice said, smiling again.

"Wait! Now we're going to come to how your second job experience will be. Your new boss is a white woman. Now you really know how to handle white women, don't you? You tell all your friends a thing or two about *that*, right?"

Waxler let up the interrogation to light another cigarette. He had been battering at the boy with scarcely time to draw breath, a spate of machine gun bullets. Maurice was not angry, or afraid; if he was, he didn't show it. He had some faith in Waxler's good intentions, or else he was simply behaving well in order to get what he wanted—the phone call to Mr. Baker at Cedar Knoll.

"Do you think this conversation is a waste of time?"

"No," Maurice mumbled.

"No, I mean it."

"You gonna call Mr. Baker?"

"I'll call him, but do you understand what I'm trying to say? Isn't it all too much hassle? Why do you need a job? You don't want a job, do you?"

"Yeah, I really want a job."

"Can you handle it when someone calls, 'Hey, Boy'?"

"Yeah, sure I can handle it, *you* call me Boy."

Waxler let out a sigh of exasperation. "But I do it in a *totally* different way. Can't you see that?" Maurice smiled. It wasn't clear whether he saw it or not.

"I don't want to wash no dishes. I don't want to clean no toilets. I want a career. I want a *career*."

Waxler shook his head and looked even more exasperated. "What do you see yourself doing 10 years from now?"

"Nothing. I'll have a job, a family."

"A family? Do you have a mother for your kids in mind?"

"Not right now."

"How many children will you have?"

"Two boys and two girls."

"My, that's a big family. But what

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do you want to *do*?"

"I want to be like you, sitting there behind your desk. That's what I want," Maurice responded, showing a spark of life, perhaps of malice, for the first time.

"Do you know what I do? Do you know anything about my job?"

"Yeah, helping people to get jobs. I know how people feel, I'm one of them."

"You don't know anything about my job. Do you know how I feel about it? You didn't ask me do I like it, is there any future, do I like my boss, is it exciting sitting here all day? You know absolutely *nothing* about my job and yet *you* want it."

Maurice laughed and shook his head.

"What about work on a construction site, out in the open air? Wouldn't that be more fun than pushing papers all day? How do I look? Do I look happy? Do I look *good*? Now go on, tell me."

Maurice was anxiously eyeing the telephone, thinking perhaps Waxler had forgotten about Mr. Baker, but clearly he was not anxious to provoke Waxler's wrath by mentioning it again.

"Listen, for the summer I can get you a job in the government. Maybe in the Park Service. I don't want you to work in an office. That might be a bad experience. They won't give you a real job, but they'll make a job for you, filing, and you'll feel great and tell your friends you're working in an office for the government. But probably you'll never get near an office again and I don't want you to get a taste for it." Waxler was referring to the fact that all federal agencies are required to employ one youth for every 40 employees during the nine weeks of the summer vacation.

"Until the summer, and after then, all I can offer is dishwashing, toilet cleaning, or, if you're really lucky and I can swing it, maybe portering. Now, do you still want a job? I can call Mr. Baker and tell him I'm trying to get you a job but I can't find one, and that'll get him off your back. You take a summer job with the Park Service, and don't bother with a dishwashing job. You've got to stay out of Cedar Knoll for your own reasons. You're going to have to sort that out. It's your decision, and a job washing dishes isn't going to help you. By the way, how about the Services?"

"No. Not now, not ever. Not in the future. I've been away from home one year and that's enough."

"It may sound just like another institution, but it isn't. It's a whole different picture." But Maurice was adamant.

"I wouldn't send kids into the Service in war time, in case they got hurt, but it's a good opening in peace," Waxler said.

Waxler picked up the phone again, and this time got through. His voice changed remarkably. He became extremely polite and restrained, and at the same time managed to convey an understanding and reasonably intimate tone.

"Hullo Mr. Baker, we're having terrible difficulties here finding a job for Maurice, although he's very eager to work. We've been frozen out of our NYC [Neighborhood Youth Corps] jobs now. It's a bad time, awfully tight. But Maurice and I will work on it together and we'll be in touch with you. He's really going to cooperate and that's all we can ask, isn't it?"

As Waxler made the pitch for him, Maurice leaned back in his chair and gazed up at the ceiling, tension showing as he chewed his lower lip. Waxler put the receiver down with a slow, deliberate gesture and shook his head solemnly at Maurice.

"You want to know what your Mr. Baker said to me? He said he thought he should tell me that due to your impossible discipline troubles it was highly unlikely that you would get your release. He said you were really terrible in that place." Maurice was looking down at the floor.

"You believe that's what he just said to me?"

"Nope."

"No, you're right. He said you

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THIS IS HOW IT IS...

WHEN YOU TAKE A JOB
YOU MAKE A DEAL
WHICH YOU BOTH MUST LIVE UP TO



were outstanding and exceptional, and he said he was glad we two had gotten together and that as long as we kept in contact, he'd report to the Team that he was satisfied."

Maurice asked me for a cigarette, but Waxler didn't ease up noticeably. "Do you still want a job?"

"Yeah, I still want a job."

"Then I'll see if I can swing the portering. You come back Monday. That's a good time to talk with employers. Be sure to come, though."

Maurice nodded and left. Waxler sighed loudly and shook his head. "He's lost. He's nowhere. At 17, I guess he's typical of his age. He doesn't have a reason to exist. He has to find his own motivation. It's no use doing anything just to satisfy the authorities and stay out of that institution."

Myer Waxler is deeply disillusioned with his job and doesn't think he'll be staying there much longer. "In the beginning I thought it was great. But now, I just don't see the point of trying to find these kids lousy jobs. Job placement isn't what they need. They talk in terms of a 'career.' What does that mean? I don't know. They all think they want to be *something. They all dream of working behind a desk. They don't stop and think what they want to* do. *No one has talked to them about things in those terms."*

Surprisingly, Waxler uses the word "mission." "I want people to have a mission in life—something they want to do for its own sake—not because of status, or money. Like Mother Theresa of Calcutta—she decided there was something she must do, and she did it."

In some ways his views have come full circle until he is almost in line with Nixon. He doesn't see the point of welfare. He thinks it's futile, debilitating, and not about to change society or redistribute wealth. "And I don't see the point in getting these kids jobs just so they can earn some money. What do they do with it? They make McDonald's rich, they fill the pockets of the shoe companies. It's not as if you could say that the money from welfare and these jobs goes into the poor community. I don't think there is a community in the ghetto any more. The stores are owned by great outside corporations. They don't even employ people from the community if they can help it. It doesn't do anyone any good. And what do the kids want all that junk for anyway? No one's starving, I mean really going without food. They don't need *all these TVs and everything. None of us needs all this junk. What we need is a mission in life. That's what I want to tell the kids."*

For this reason he doesn't greatly mourn the imminent passing of Neighborhood Youth Corps, the program that provides summer jobs and a few part-time jobs for school kids. The funding for that program has been cut drastically and may end altogether in the District in June. Kids hate the jobs they are given under the program, mostly because they aren't real jobs, and they are kept in all day, hanging around with nothing much to do, treated like school children, not employees. Waxler would rather subsi-

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dize them to go to school all summer. Also, he says that they never save the money for the following school year, but spend it all at once on things that don't help them at all. "It's the same story with most of the programs. They just weren't working that well." How were his views different from Nixon's? "I wouldn't just do away with the programs. I'd want to restructure everything altogether."

Restructuring society's values is all very well, but it is hard to feel that it might be more productive and fairer to start with those who already have too much and might be willing to exchange money for mission. "I guess that's why I won't be in this job too long," he said. Social workers in this sort of situation can only act as agents for society as it is. Gentle, liberal do-gooding is all they are there for, and if they start trying to reform society, they find themselves in a squeeze, and the people they are supposed to be assisting tend to get a hard rap across the knuckles instead of a helping hand.

On Monday morning Waxler was in a bad way. He had a severe sinus headache, and one eye was red and closed up; otherwise, as always, he looked very pale, as if he'd scarcely seen the light of day. He kept saying that he'd have to go home, but as more and more clients dropped by to see him he didn't manage to get away.

As I came in he was slouched further down in his chair than usual—even his good eye was closed. A black girl with tangly, unbrushed hair had rested her head on his desk so I couldn't see her face. As I came up to the desk Waxler said "hi" and waved me toward a chair. The girl lifted her head and moved her chair to make room for me. She looked as though she could hardly keep her eyes open.

There was a long silence, then Waxler stared straight at me and said disconcertingly, "What have you been doing all weekend?"

I felt like a client of his and said, "Nothing much." I was on the defensive, like his clients.

Waxler rubbed the painful side of his face. The girl, after giving me one long look, rested her head in her hand and seemed about to fall asleep. Waxler tried to pull himself together and get the conversation going again. Perhaps they'd both been asleep for a while before I came.

"This is Zelda," he said. "How long have I known you now, Zelda?"

"You always known me, Myer Waxler," she said.

"No, Zelda, that's not true. I've known you for two years." He took a pack of cough drops out of his shirt pocket.

"So when are you going to get me into the Kalorama House?" she asked, a slight whine in her voice. She was picking at the papers on the desk. Kalorama is a half-way house for people with mental problems.

"I ain't gonna get you in nowhere. I've told you that, Zelda."

"Then how am I gonna get in?"

"If you really want to get in, you go get yourself in." This conversation had clearly been going on a long, long time and was going around in circles.

"How am I gonna get in there?"

"I'll tell you what, Zelda. I don't think things have gotten bad enough for you yet at home."

"Oh, they're bad enough."

"No, I don't think so. Let's wait 'til the bullets and knives start flying."

"They're bad enough, Mr. Waxler," she said.

"You know what I'm saying? You gotta make your own decision to get out of home. Long as you stay there, long as you and your mother have each other, you're both going to stay sick. You know that?"

"Yeah, I know that. I want to get out."

"How old are you now, Zelda?"

"I'm near 19. What am I going to do? I've still got the same life, the same problems I always had. Will I still be at home 10 years from now?"

"I don't know. That's up to you. Have you really thought it out? What about your baby? How old is he, four

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HOW TO SCORE...
● DIG THE SCENE
● LEARN YOUR THING
● DON'T COP OUT EASY

months?"

"My mother's going to raise him."

"Your mother? You going to be Auntie Zelda, then?"

"No, I'm going to be Mamma."

"Not if your mother raises him."

She shook her head.

"Now look, Zelda, there are things you have to get straight about the baby. That baby is going to get sick. When he gets older your mother is not going to be able to handle it. I said first you should have an abortion, then I said you should have it adopted. Now tell me, how is a baby going to survive between you and your mother? You've got to face your problems, get organized so you can care for that child."

"I guess I ain't woman enough to face my problems."

The phone rang, and while Waxler was talking Zelda got up and began drifting about the room, looking at things on people's desks, saying "hi" to everyone, singing to herself, and dancing and shuffling. Then she drifted out of the room altogether. When Waxler put the phone down he explained her story.

"She used to be worse when she first came to me. She's really improved. She used to run around the place yelling and shouting, sitting on the floor, throwing papers around—you couldn't talk with her. The last year she's really made progress." He said she came in to see him whenever she felt like it, sometimes every day, sometimes not for a couple of weeks. Her mother was psychotic, alcoholic, and violent. Sometimes she locked Zelda and the baby in a room for 12 or 14 hours while she had a man in the house, so that Zelda couldn't even go to the bathroom. Her mother yelled at social workers, psychiatrists, anyone who came to the door. Waxler had once spoken with her on the telephone and been shouted at. Many of the therapists who had dealt with Zelda didn't believe her stories about her mother. Every time he had arranged for Zelda to get away from her mother, within a few days she had always gone back, seeming to need the violence.

Originally Zelda had come to Waxler looking for a summer job. He saw that she had no chance of holding one down, and their meetings now have nothing to do with employment.

Zelda came back humming and shuffling. "You going to get me in there?"

"Zelda, if you really want to go, then go. It's nothing to do with me. I've explained over and over, you're going to have to go through a lot of hassle. You've got to get your mental health case worker to sign papers and arrange with the guy at Kalorama House. Leave me out of it. You just make the others uptight every time you mention my name. Go to them—and stop doing that!" She was spitting into the trash can. "Why won't you try and act like a lady? And, for the hundredth time, why won't you carry a pocketbook?"

"My mother got my pocketbook."

"Your mother, and you're 19!"

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"She keeps my papers, my welfare card, Medicaid, and all that."

"You got to have identity. Carry some identity, and a book with phone numbers. Every lady has a pocketbook."

"I got one but there ain't nothing in it."

"Keep Kleenex in it, then you wouldn't do that in the trash."

"This world wasn't made for me."

"Go on, then, pick up the phone and arrange for yourself to go to Kalorama House. You've met the people there. They'll take you as long as they think you won't drift back home after a couple of days. I know you, Zelda. You like to get us all occupied with your problems, all of us fixing this and that, and when we've got everything fixed up, Zelda isn't there, she's slipped away from the middle, leaving us looking silly."

Zelda suddenly giggled and couldn't stop.

"Why do you laugh whenever we talk about your relationship with your mother? Do you think it's funny?"

"Must be," and she began singing again, got to her feet and picked up some papers.

"Zelda, this bullshitting around has got to end. I'm going to tell you something. You're operating on a 10-year-old level. You have to cope with all these problems when you have the mentality of a 10-year-old. You have a lot of catching up to do if you want to be fully grown at 21." He paused.

"Now, what do you know about this Kalorama House? You've been there once for a meal, right? What's that place for?"

"Help me solve my problems."

"What kind of people are in there? You see really crazy people?"

"No! Well, maybe. There was one guy reading the newspaper all the time, couldn't stop himself laughing."

"You do that too, you know, sometimes."

"I know I do that, grinning all the time for nothing, I know that. But it's a nice place, Mr. Waxler. They cook nice chili beans, nice dessert. They got TV and a record player. You can help in the kitchens, and all you got to do is keep the place clean."

"Are they mostly white or black people?"

"Mostly white. There's one dude, he's the chef, though. I don't notice these things."

"I think you think white people are better."

"No! Well, white people are more trustworthy. They know better how to handle situations." She was beginning to droop again, and her head was back on the desk.

"Why are you asleep, Zelda?"

"I ain't asleep."

"You go to sleep whenever someone isn't shouting at you. You notice that when I start talking softly, you act up and try to make me shout at you? Are you going to manage in that place with no one shouting at you all day? I think you think you aren't even living if someone isn't yelling at you. If you need your mother to throw bottles at your head, they aren't about to do that for you in that place."

"You gonna get me in there?"

Waxler told her to go right away to the mental health department and see Mr. Goodall, her caseworker, and finally, Zelda went. The conversation had lasted much longer than recorded here, about an hour and a half, and had probably started a long time before I arrived. A great deal of it was repetition, Waxler hammering at her from one tack, and then from another. Zelda up and down, old and young, intelligent and stupid in turns. It was an exhausting business.

We took some time out to go upstairs to the canteen for a quick coffee. Without the kids, Waxler was a different man. He seemed to turn on some switch that set in action a tremendous performance the moment a client appeared. The kids seemed to like it, and Waxler seemed to like it too.

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

GO FOR THE BIG BREAD
LEARN NEW SKILLS
GET THE TRAINING

"I'm very rough on these kids, not because I'm a mean man, but they have to come up against someone. The only thing that amazes me is that they come back." He sees himself as a very sick man, a man with many problems. He thinks his problems are a good deal worse than the problems facing most of these kids. He thinks, too, that he's a lot unhappier than they are. This is what gives him such self-confidence in apparently riding roughshod over their most sensitive areas.

He is a curiously puritanical man to be in this line of business. He describes himself as being a Jew for Jesus. He took it very seriously when I likened that to being a Democrat for Nixon. Waxler had a fairly rigorous Jewish upbringing, and then recently decided that Christianity is the answer. He is against sex, thinks lust is evil, and doesn't seem particularly concerned that none of the girls he sees uses contraceptives. He always asks everyone who comes in how many children they have. Almost all the girls, and the boys, too, have children, usually being cared for by grandparents. He battles against money and status, and puzzles a good deal about marriage and duty. He wants to get married, but doesn't dare. He sees all the illegitimate babies as products of these kids' despair. "What else can they create in the world except babies? I don't blame them for that."

Next morning a boy was in Waxler's office, looking through the file of jobs. After about half an hour of puzzling out what he was looking at, the boy had scrawled down two telephone numbers. Waxler leaned over the youth's shoulder and watched.

"Hey, Boy!" he said. "Do you know what jobs you're looking at?"

"Yeah, jobs."

"These are women's jobs you've been looking at all this time. Look—house cleaning, baby-sitting."

"I can baby-sit."

"Sure, who's going to have you for a baby sitter, with a one or two-year-old child?" Then Waxler realized, "Oh, you don't read too good, huh?"

This was James Stewart, an old client of Waxler's. He was first put in an institution at the age of eight, and has scarcely been out since then. He had a bad drug problem, which he seems to have gotten over.

They looked through the right list of jobs. "I'm going to have to steal a car to get out to most of those places," James said. They picked out a couple of dishwashing jobs.

"You going to be a dishwasher all your life, James?"

"I guess so."

"You've got to get back in school some time, learn to read and write, or else you're going to be retarded the rest of your life. Now come on, after me, A, B, C, D, E, F, G," he sang, and James laughed.

"I want to get into computer processing."

"Computer processing! What's this? You don't want to get your hands dirty, like the guy on TV who gets up and says, 'Work with computers so you don't get your hands dirty'?"

They went back to Waxler's desk,

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James having carefully copied down what Waxler had indicated, but not able to read what he had written.

"How are you going to introduce yourself when you call that number? I've heard you doing it before and I know how you mumble."

"Uh uh."

"Go on—what are you going to say?"

"Is that the Hickory House? Could I speak to Mr. L-L-Lewis?" (He couldn't read what he'd written.) "Are you still hiring people?"

"Still hiring people? For what?" Waxler said. "What sort of a mess is this? Start again."

"Could I speak with Mr. Lewis? My name is James Stewart."

"Listen. Like this: 'Mr. Lewis? This is James Stewart calling. I'm wondering if you still have an opening for a dishwasher.' Now try again."

"Mr. Lewis? You still hiring dishwashers?"

"No. NO. Why not say James F. Stewart. Let's add that middle initial. Come on, you fag."

"You can't call people fags!"

"You're the one who's always talking so much about your fabulous love life—that makes me wonder. When were you last here? You gotten uglier since then." The telephone conversation had been forgotten.

"What was it you got locked up for the age of eight?"

"Robbery. I was with the big boys, with these big dudes. We went burgling in people's houses. I couldn't run fast as they could."

Waxler tried to persuade him to go away to Job Corps, but James wasn't keen.

"I know why that is. There'd be a whole big, nervous breakdown among the females in this town if you went away, right? These frustrated women, what are they going to do? You got a lot of women?"

"I got a lot, but I got one special one."

"How long you known her?"

"Since she was nine. She's three years younger than me. But I didn't mess with her physically at that time."

"Oh, you waited 'til she was 10, did you?"

"I waited 'til she was 14."

"She have children?"

"Yeah, one."

"Yours?"

"She says so."

"Have you got one girl or 101 girls?"

"I tell the others I ain't got nothing for them, that I just got one girl. I tell them there's only one thing I can do for them and they seem to accept that one thing." Myer and James both laughed.

"You turn them down ever? Your girl likes to share you, does she?"

"We both got each other. She knows I'm here, and I know she's there. If we ain't together she knows I gotta be messing with someone."

"How about her?"

"The dudes say she's evil. But I'm making her stay in school. If she drops out she knows I'll beat her up and down the street."

"So you want her to get a good education so she can support you, is that it?"

"No. I want her to have what I ain't got."

"How did this conversation start, do you remember?"

"That dishwashing job."

"No it didn't. I was talking about you going to Job Corps, to finish your education and get some training."

"Then don't you make me talk no more about my girl. I might say something I don't want to say," and they both laughed again.

"So, you don't want to learn a trade where you get your hands dirty? Let's look at those beautiful hands. You got to go to beautician school with hands like that."

James laughed and left, saying he'd drop by again, soon.

Waiting for more clients, Myer Waxler explained how he had been in D. C. Manpower for eight years. The first four of those had been good, he

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said. He felt he was really doing something worthwhile. He had been out "in the field," by which he meant that he worked most of the time in the pre-release part of a reform school, trying to gear the kids to the outside world, to make them employable. But he was called back to the office, his program canceled, and he was put, much to his disgust, behind a desk. Since then, he has been quietly forgotten. More programs have been cut away. He is now a training salesman with nothing left to sell, except Jobs Corps, which is a non-starter. There was, in the beginning, a whole range of openings and opportunities, and now there is nothing.

At first Waxler was an enthusiastic young social worker, full of high-flown ideologies, theories for solving every problem, fitting everyone into a suitable box. "There are two kinds of people working in this field," he says. "The complete Pollyannas who are so guilt-ridden when confronting these kids that they aren't any use to anyone, and then there are the real authoritarians. I've been both of those. I've been everything, and I've made every mistake there is." Now he is left disillusioned and depressed. He has no idea where he is going or whether his work has any point at all. All he has is a remarkable skill for getting through to the kids, a rapport, up to a point, a reasonable set of expectations for them, an uncynical eye that has come to terms with what they are and what they need.

But in the department, his style is not appreciated. Waxler's work cannot be evaluated and quantified. His qualifications are confusing and the Department of Labor doesn't want to tangle with people. They are interested in jobs. So, Waxler thinks his days there are numbered. With the decline of the training programs he thinks his job might soon be eased out. He is not in the least worried by this thought. In some ways it might come as a relief. He would be forced to make some important decisions about himself, his work, and his life. "Maybe I'll dig ditches all day and do some kind of volunteer psychiatric counseling at night," he said more than once. He meant digging ditches literally, getting away from office work. But looking at him, tired and pale, I couldn't quite see Waxler out there stripped to the waist in the sun under a hard hat.

He is an odd, disconcerting, and eccentric man, but for all that he is sane, self-aware and perceptive. He thinks and talks a great deal about himself and his problems. One can see sometimes why he gets in so close to adolescents, why he is able to take adolescent confusions and identity crises as seriously as the kids take themselves.

At the end of the day, after another session with Zelda, two tall, black youths came in together. They were not particularly remarkable looking, not as well dressed as some of the others. The taller of the two, the one who took the lead, had enormous eyes with long, curling lashes.

"They let you in here, too, do they?" Waxler said, by way of welcome.

They came and sat down.

"I want a job," said Raymond, who did most of the talking. "I'm going to school, and I want a job now."

"How can you want a job if you're in school? What school is it?"

"I can change my hours around. It's the Urban League Prep School."

"It'll have to be changed to nights. There are no part-time jobs around."

"I ain't going to night school. Bad boys'll beat me up on the way home. Go on, give me a job."

"I don't have jobs, just like that. I don't walk around with pocketfuls of them."

"You from England?" Raymond said, suddenly turning on me. He was off into his world of fantasy. "I was going to school in England not long ago. I was going to Maidstone, you know that place? To study law at the Holt School. Then I decided to go to Edinburgh instead. I had my ticket

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and everything. Costs around $300, don't it?"

"Hey, hey! Now wait a minute, what is this? This crazy talk or something? I never heard *this* one before. Where did he get the money for all this dreaming?" Waxler asked David, the other boy, who laughed.

"Oh, we have our resources. We have our business, you know, don't we?" Raymond said. David nodded in agreement, smiling all the time.

"What is this? Superfly?" Waxler said. "It's a common fantasy, the only fantasy of all these kids."

"I'm running the Mafia in this city," Raymond said. "I have people in Africa, Saudi Arabia, everywhere in the world." There was something remarkable about him, a surprising smattering of knowledge.

"You had a job recently?"

"I worked in Ramada Inn out in Bethesda, as a cook."

"Why did you leave?"

"I had to go to New York, to conduct business."

"Why do you guys need jobs from me? You can get jobs on your own."

"We gotta go pretty soon. We got to see Joseph Yeldell when he gets back from lunch." This astounded both of us. Yeldell is the head of Washington's Department of Human Resources, a key man in the city.

"How do you know Yeldell? What do you want to see him for?"

"Oh, we drink with Yeldell. We were raised in institutions and we know all the big men in this city."

"Look, what is this talk? You seem a whole lot happier than you were last time you were here. Last time you were really down. Why did you quit Ramada Inn?"

"Because they wouldn't let me be manager."

"What?"

"No, it was because they wouldn't let me take a week's vacation when I had to go to New York. The other dude who worked in the kitchen was on vacation so they said they couldn't let me go too."

"Where did you go in New York?"

"Brooklyn, Bronx, Long Island, Manhattan, I had business in all them places."

"Did you have a band to welcome you when you got there?"

"No sir! This stuff is strictly undercover, confidential."

"How did you go there, you have a chauffeur drive you round?"

"No, we took the Greyhound bus. That way, nobody suspects you. We had our guns."

"Guns? Two bammers with a pair of guns. What did you carry them in, a brown paper bag?"

"A blue suitcase, a .38 and a machine gun," David said.

"You know something? You guys really entertain me. This is a lot of fun. Now, what's the name of this machine gun of yours?"

"It's an M-16."

"An M-16, eh? Well, an M-16 is not a machine gun. It has a clip, right?"

"Yeah, it has a clip."

"How many bullets does it fire?"

"A hundred," David said.

"Wrong," Waxler said triumphantly, and probably with some relief. "It does not. Lies, all lies. What a load of crazy talk you got." He took a cigarette. "You guys have fun, don't you? You really have a good conversation. I mean it. I really mean I haven't enjoyed rapping with anyone for a long time."

"We got connections in this place. I can rap with these people." Raymond didn't ask to use the phone, but leaned across the desk and began dialing.

"This is Raymond Fogg speaking," he said. "Who am I speaking with? His manner was perfectly polished. "I would like to speak with Miss Moore, if I could." There was a long pause. Raymond handed the telephone over to David. "He usually deals with these matters for me."

"You really think Yeldell is going to talk with you?"

"We know him. He came to our going-away party from Junior Village."

"Next time you get him on the

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phone, please let me speak with him."

In the background David was being fobbed off by a secretary.

"She says Yeldell will be back at 2:30. We'll go round to him then."

"We can have you speak with Mayor Washington, too, if you want," Raymond said.

"Yeah, I'd really like that," Waxler answered.

"We got a few senators on our payroll, too. We put them in power. We're working on the President, too. We should have him out by 1976." Everyone laughed. David was still on the phone to Yeldell's office.

"We're friends of Mr. Yeldell's," he was saying. "We'll be over at 2:30," and hung up.

"Hey, you guys, why don't you try and hustle me a job?"

"You want to be Mayor?"

"Or janitor, or empty the trash, anything," Waxler said.

"You can shine my shoes, if you're good," Raymond said.

"You gonna get us jobs then?" David asked, stretching out his legs.

"I don't know what you want, do I? I don't know if it fits in with your school schedule."

Raymond was still looking through the files, "Just want to see if there's anyone else here I know." They weren't real files, just a pile of job application forms.

Waxler managed to talk with David, to persuade him to take a job in a body shop where he already had some experience. "I'll give you a job introduction card," Waxler was saying, when Raymond overheard.

"One of those cards? Someone pulled a gun on me once when I showed one of those."

"Come on, stop all this weak dream stuff," Waxler said, getting bored.

"If someone tries to kill me that ain't no weak dream stuff." Raymond begins to discuss the possibility of breaking open Waxler's locks with a bobby pin. "Trouble is, they don't wear those pins no more. We used to break safes, but now, in our business, we have people do it for us.

"Now which is it? You have a business or you want a job?"

"We want a job, and don't ask questions why."

"No deal," Waxler yawned and stretched. "I'm tired, tired," he said.

"Tired of living?" said Raymond, quick as a flash. "I'll put a contract on you." We all laughed.

Raymond had been rummaging through Waxler's drawer, and with a small gasp of pleasure he came upon a cigar wrapped in cellophane.

"You smoke cigars?" Waxler asked, a slight note of anxiousness in his voice, as if he had been saving up the cigar specially. Raymond was pulling at the outer leaves and it seemed to be falling apart. Raymond then began to lick it all over, from top to bottom.

"He expects free cigars where he goes because he's an executive type person," Waxler said, watching his cigar getting very wet. "I didn't realize it was that stale," he said coolly, with an air of sour grapes. Then someone came and called him away for a moment.

The two boys stood up as soon as he was gone. Raymond had lit the cigar and was puffing on it in an unprofessional manner. He gave David a puff. All of a sudden, seeing that no one was around, they decided to take off. Without saying a word to me, or each other, but looking particularly delighted with the cigar, they sauntered out of the office and down the corridor towards the elevator. All they left behind was the smell of cigar smoke drifting slowly through the still-hot, unchanging air of the Student Services Division.

From *The Washington Post* of March 25, 1973:

A nationwide survey of 38,200 high school students has found a still flourishing faith in the free enterprise system–50 per cent of the students felt they could become millionaires if they tried. ■

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the political puzzle

by John Barclay



ACROSS

1. Regatta we wish we had not seen. (9)
6. Recap after regatta we don't like either. (5)
9. Backing tree art. (7)
10. Republican spoilsports? (7)
11. Spoon or driver, or neither? (5-4)
12. Pretty simple when I am thrown in with lawyers. (5)
13. After egg factory. (5)
15. The Cockney, he cavorted too much on stage. (9)
18. Wild party to end car ban. (4-5)
19. The doctor is out, Henry. (5)
21. Hangs onto suitcases? (5)
23. When these are special, resist ten times as hard! (9)
25. Why Belgian feels at home in Calcutta. (7)
26. They make the future so clear. (7)
27. You must be red or dead! (5)
28. Young lady carrying Indian head brings lots of trouble. (9)

DOWN

1. Wrap tie less secure than intended. (7)
2. He carried it into terminal. (5)
3. What creep did for Nixon. (9)
4. When warmest, you need fanner, too. (9)
5. Conspiracy will riven by respected Senator. (5)
6. Two little companies produce article many like hot. (5)
7. Marched in front of dept. store. (9)
8. General Norstad writes French plays? (7)
14. What they were after raid anger ceased. (9)
16. They are both primary and general. (9)
17. This succeeded at the farm. (9)
18. Difficult to overcome, but not about bog. (7)
20. He is down in intervals but fights back. (7)
22. Art is on the way down. (5)
23. Love in Southern France coming up, in a manner of speaking. (5)
24. He loves to work puzzles. (5)

The numbers indicate the number of letters and words, e.g., (2, 3) means a two-letter word followed by a three-letter word. Groups of letters, e.g., USA, are treated as one word. Answers to last month's puzzle are on page 32.

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political book notes

Public affairs books to be published in May.

America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities. David P. Calleo, Benjamin M. Rowland. Indiana University, $10.95/$2.95. Argues that American foreign policy—especially during its "internationalist" phases and in its prescriptions for the Third World—is based on a textbook-economics idea of the world, in which national borders are inconvenient barriers to the growth of international business. The authors do a fine job of showing the ill consequences and looking for alternatives.

The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control. David F. Musto, M.D. Yale, $10.95. This detailed, well-written history covers much familiar ground but will nevertheless serve as a solid reference. Musto's only expressed conclusions are that past solutions to the drug problem have been ineffective and some previous attitudes have been groundless. Musto does not emphasize that the need for drugs, rather than drugs themselves, drives addicts to crime. His objective neutrality unfortunately blinds him to the fact that legalization is one issue on which both common sense and the Constitution are in overwhelming agreement.

The American Inquisition 1945-1960. Cedric Belfrage. Bobbs-Merrill, $8.95.

Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots of Commitment. Russell H. Fifield. T. Y. Crowell, $10.

The B. S. Factor: The Theory and Technique of Faking It Big in America. Arthur Herzog. Simon & Schuster, $6.95. Setting out to demolish fakery and cant in American

Photo: Patricia Ellsberg

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PAPERS ON THE WAR

SIMON AND SCHUSTER

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life, Herzog goes beyond obvious targets like the speeches of Maurice Stans and the semantic excesses of Madison Avenue. He takes his material a bit too seriously, but you can't really fault a book which recommends that reporters "attend Platitude Recognition Training Sessions, the object being to raise cliche-consciousness," and notes that "the United States Army Intelligence School, charged with giving courses in torture, manages to call itself USAINTS."

The Briar Patch: The People of the State of New York v Lumumba Shaker et al. Murray Kempton. Dutton, $7.95.

Changing Women in a Changing Society. Joan Huber, ed. University of Chicago, $7.95/$2.95. This collection of essays by movement-oriented authors was originally a special issue of *The American Journal of Sociology*. Combining personal observations with academic insights, the book generally avoids both the sociologist's notorious sterility and the movement's frequent appeals to Jacobinism.

The Chinese Difference. Joseph Kraft. Saturday Review, $5.95. Kraft is refreshing since he is one visitor to China who has not been captivated by the New Maoist Man: "The Chinese. . . are not old-time true believers. Fanatical devotion is curbed by the levity and skepticism of a cultivated people." Nonetheless, this small book, the bulk of which appeared in *The New Yorker* is thin on substance and suffers more than occasionally from an excess of punditry.

The City in American Politics. Paul Kramer, Frederick Holborn, eds. Putnam, $6.95.

CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968. August Meier, Elliott Rudwick. Oxford, $15.

Corporate Country: A State Shaped to Suit Technology. William H. Rodgers, Jr.Rodale. Portions of this book appeared in adapted form in the November, 1972, issue of *The Washington Monthly*.

Cutting Loose: A Civilized Guide for Getting Out of the System. Dorothy Kalins. Saturday Review, $6.95.

Death and Taxes: Some Perspectives on Inheritance, Inequality and Progressive Taxation in the United States. Richard E. Wagner. American Enterprise Institute, $3.

Drew Pearson: An Unauthorized Biography. Oliver Pilat. Harper & Row, $10.

The F.D.R. Memoirs. Bernard Asbell. Doubleday, $10.

Farm Commodity Programs: An Opportunity for Change. D. Gale Johnson. American Enterprise Institute, $3.

First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times. Chalmers M. Roberts. Praeger, $10. The most remarkable parts of this admirable book are not the insider's reports of diplomatic events, but Roberts' reflections on the craft of journalism.

From Aid to Re-Colonization: Lessons of a Failure. Tibor Mende. Pantheon, $10. Well-informed but unimaginative look at the dilemmas of international aid.

Garbage: The History and Future of Garbage in the United States. Katie Kelly. Saturday Review, $7.95.

Generations: The Family Today. Leontine Young. McGraw-Hill, $7.95.

Good Times: An Oral History of America in the Nineteen-Sixties. Peter Joseph. Charterhouse, $9.95. In this outgrowth of a Princeton senior thesis, Joseph has attempted to fuse 125 brief interviews into an oral history of the 1960s a la Studs Terkel. But where Terkel's tape recorder captured the cadences of an era by focusing on the ordinary, Joseph, a questioner of the "and then what happened?" school, collected celebrity interviews the way others collect autographs. The result is—with a few conspicuous exceptions —twice-told tales; Clark Kerr and Dean Rusk end up sounding like Clark Kerr and Dean Rusk.

The Great Plains States of America: People, Politics, and Power in the Nine Great Plains States. Neal R. Pierce. Norton, $9.95.

The Health Insurance Racket and How to Beat It. John E. Gregg. Regnery, $6.95.

Home from the War: Transformations of Vietnam Veterans. Robert J. Lifton. Simon & Schuster, $7.95. After talks with members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War, psycho-historian Lifton describes the psychological effects of their experiences and tells some horrible stories. It would be nice to know about the other veterans, too, but Lifton doesn't claim to provide a cross section.

How to Cut the Cost of Education. Shelley Umans. McGraw-Hill, $6.95.

I. Q. In the Meritocracy. R. J. Herrnstein. Atlantic/Little Brown, $7.95. The author warns that, by removing the arbitrary barriers that prevent people from attaining their natural level in society, we will create a self-perpetuating aristocracy of merit. He overestimates the significance of I. Q. and the likelihood that the barriers will be eradicated. Provocative reading nonetheless.

Indispensable Enemies: The Politics of Misrule in America. Walter Karp. Saturday Review, $7.95. Karp is convinced that the efforts of "party bosses" and "oligarchs" (ominous terms never really defined) to thwart reform and thereby maintain themselves in power are at the root of all of America's problems. For example, "the presumption is strong. . . that Johnson launched

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the Vietnam War because he hoped the war would kill reform [and] that it would split and then reduce his Democratic majorities." Devilishly clever, those party oligarchs.

The Institutional Imperative: How to Understand the U. S. Government and Other Bulky Objects. Robert N. Kharasch. Charterhouse, $7.95.

International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry. Mason Willrich, ed. Johns Hopkins, $10.

Jewish Radicalism, A Selected Anthology. Jack N. Porter, Peter Dreier, eds. Grove Press, $7.95/$2.45.

Local Interest Politics: A One-way Street. Betty H. Zisk. Bobbs-Merrill, $10.

Matching Needs and Resources: Reforming the Federal Budget. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Dan Larkins, Philip N. Marcus. American Enterprise Institute, $3.00

Misdirected Medicine. Sam McClatchie, M.D. Walker, $6.95.

The Monopoly Makers: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Regulation and Competition. Mark J. Green, ed. Grossman, $7.95.

One Hundred Countries, Two Billion People. Robert S. McNamara. Praeger. A collection of McNamara's recent speeches, showing that in his five years at the World Bank, he has lost little of his sense of mission. Fortunately, the goals are different now.

The Open Prison: Saving Their Lives and Our Money. Sol Chaneles. Dial, $6.95. An excessively shrill and poorly documented brief for community control of prisons that illustrates the inability of many liberals to face the realities of a pervasive national fear of crime. Proposals for inmate-owned prisons and suggestions that medical schools in prisons could solve the doctor shortage do little to help build a serious constituency for prison reform.

The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power. David Wise. Random House, $8.95. A spine-chilling catalog of outright lying and the misuse of power and secrecy by the government. The distant tramp of the jackboot echoes through accounts ranging from presidential lying about Vietnam to Lyndon Johnson's claim of a nonexistent ancestor at the Alamo. The total effect is slightly marred by Wise's inability to evaluate the importance of the different incidents of presidential lying, and his confusion of these episodes with less clear-cut issues of the freedom of the press.

Power Play: The Story of the Quest for Oil in the Middle East. Leonard Mosley. Random House, $10.

Public Administration as Political Process. John Rehfuss. Scribner's, $7.95. The author clearly understands that public admini-

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stration does not take place in some "sanitized world safe from the swirls and uncertainties of politics." He also realizes that state and local governments employ about three fourths of all public officials. A sound book by a political scientist who has actually worked in government.

A Public Citizen's Action Manual. Donald Ross. Grossman, $3.95/$1.95. While some of Ralph Nader's remarks—appeals to "national citizenship struggle" and "the flame of citizenship"—suggest a middle-class Mao exhorting his suburban cadres to action, Ross's book provides practical but imaginative suggestions for consumer action, ranging from the correct procedures for filing noise pollution complaints to advice on checking local property tax assessments.

Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration. Donald R. McCoy, Richard T. Ruetten. University of Kansas, $12.

Retreat From Empire? The First Nixon Administration. Robert Osgood et al. Johns Hopkins, $15/$3.95.

Retreat From Victory: A Critical Appraisal of American Foreign and Military Policy, from 1920 to the 1970s. Drew Middleton. Hawthorn, $7.95.

Rizzo: From Cop to Mayor of Philadelphia. Fred Hamilton. Viking, $8.95.

The truth behind Rhodesia's anti-colonial struggle.

THE RIGHT TO SAY NO

by Judith Todd

The daughter of the former Rhodesian Prime Minister recounts her five weeks in solitary confinement, without either a trial or being accused of a crime in "this well-written and eloquent book" (*Publishers Weekly*) about one country's epic struggle for freedom. $6.95



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SDS: Ten Years Toward a Revolution. Kirkpatrick Sale. Random House, $15. Writing a history of SDS—let alone one based on written records and retrospective interviews—is a difficult task, but Sale, who for generational reasons "was never part of SDS," has produced an exhaustive, sympathetic, and refreshingly non-dogmatic narrative. Focusing perhaps excessively on the national officers of what was a thoroughly unstructured organization, Sale never really probes the minds of the average members or satisfactorily answers why by late 1967 "SDSers involved in theory tended to give up the hard work of fashioning their own" and turned instead to increasingly vulgar Marxism. This failure of ideas, rather than the later factionalism and fanaticism, was the real death of SDS.

The Seamy Side of Democracy: Repression in America. Alan Wolfe. McKay, $6.95.

The Second Crash: How the Stock Market Went the 1929 Route in 1970* (*but missed it by one phone call). Charles Ellis. Simon & Schuster, $5.95. A joy to find an exciting, readable, and essential book about the Stock Exchange. Describing the extraordinary vulnerability and inefficiency of the "best club in the world," Ellis' strong story line tells of an imaginary stock market crash—based on a real incident in 1970.

A Spectacle Unto the World: The Catholic Worker Movement. Robert Coles. Viking, $10.

Strategy for a Living Revolution. George Lakey. Grossman, $7.95. A former director of the Friends Peace Committee in Philadelphia has written a sensible and humane rejection of violent tactics.

Structural Reform of the Federal Budget Process. William Niskanen. American Enterprise Institute, $3. A thoughtful examination of four major flaws in the federal budget process by a former assistant director for evaluation at OMB.

Unlearning the Lie—Sexism in School. Barbara Harrison. Liveright.

War and Politics. Bernard Brodie. Macmillan, $8.95.

Witness to History 1929-1969. Charles E. Bohlen. Norton, $12.50.

Your Right to Know: The Case Against Government Subpoena of Journalists. Charles W. Whalen, Jr. Random House, $5.95/$1.65. Congressman Whalen's (R-Ohio) case for a modified journalistic shield law—like most books originating on Capitol Hill—reads like an amalgam of the Congressional *Record* and a legal brief. A gold mine if you are writing a high-school term paper. Otherwise it's disappointing, as it avoids the subtleties of a complex issue.

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